

POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF MUSLIM COUNTRIES

MUSULMON MAMLAKATLARI TASHQI SIYOSATINING SIYOSIY TAHLILI

ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ АНАЛИЗ ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ МУСУЛЬМАНСКИХ СТРАН

KADIROVA Guzal Shukhrat qizi,

Tashkent State University of Oriental studies

Doctor of philosophy (PhD) in political sciences,

Associate professor

e-mail: guzal.kadirova.1986@mail.ru

Mirabad dist., 20, Amir Temur str., Tashkent, 100060,

Uzbekistan

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Abstract: This study explores the specific characteristics of the foreign policies of Muslim-majority countries where Islam constitutes a significant societal factor. It is well known that religion manifests itself in different ways, depending on the historical heritage, culture and socio-political development of a country. At the same time, it has a significant impact on the foreign policy of all Muslim states. Thus, the Islamic factor is present both in the state's foreign policy strategy and in the ideological forms promoted by non-state actors.

The state policy of Muslim countries is mainly dominated by the idea of promoting their 'own' local form of Islam. After the Arab Spring, its 'soft power' became an integral part of the new geopolitics, and even more than in the past, Muslim countries are trying to shape and promote their image of a 'moderate' version of Islam and adhere to it in their foreign policy.

The author examines non-state actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic State (ISIS), which criticize the existing regimes in Muslim countries and cast doubt on their legitimacy. Thus, they challenge the existing authorities not only in terms of traditional notions of power but also from the perspective of religious legitimacy. Any claims of this kind are perceived by governments as an existential threat, as are any alternative interpretations of Islam promoted at the regional or international level by other states.

The article analyzes the intensification of armed conflicts and disputes, showing that their spillover into neighboring states indicates that the process of geopolitical transformation has not concluded and that the new balance of power in the region remains uncertain.

Keywords: Muslim countries, Islamic world, Islamic factor, religious organizations, "Muslim Brothers", Hamas, the concept of "hard" and "soft power", "smart power", hybrid war, Iran, Egypt, "Arab spring", foreign policy process.

Annotatsiya: Ushbu maqolada islom omili jamiyatda muhim rol o'ynaydigan musulmon davlatlarining tashqi

siyosatining o'ziga xos xususiyatlari tadqiq qilingan. Ma'lumki, diniy omil mamlakatning tarixiy merosi, madaniyati va ijtimoiy-siyosiy rivojlanishining xususiyatlariga bog'liq holda har xil ko'rinishda namoyon bo'ladi. Shu bilan birga, u barcha musulmon davlatlarning tashqi siyosatiga sezilarli ta'sir ko'rsatadi. Shunday qilib, Islom omili davlat tashqi siyosati strategiyasida ham, nodavlat ishtirokchilari ilgari surgan mafkura shaklida ham mavjud.

Musulmon mamlakatlarining davlat siyosatida asosan islomning "o'z" mahalliy shaklini targ'ib qilish g'oyasi ustunlik qiladi. "Arab Bahori" dan keyin uning "yumshoq kuchi" yangi geosiyosatning ajralmas qismiga aylandi va hattoki, bundan ham ko'proq, musulmon mamlakatlari o'zlarining Islomning "mo'tadil" versiyasini yaratishga va targ'ib qilishga harakat qilmoqdalar va tashqi siyosatida unga rioya qilmoqdalar.

Muallif maqolada "Musulmon Birodarlar" tashkiloti yoki "Islomiy Davlat" (ISHID) kabi nodavlat subyektlarni o'rganadi, ular musulmon davlatlarining mavjud rejimlarini tanqid qilib, ularning qonuniyligiga shubha tug'diradi. Shunday qilib, mavjud hokimiyatlarni nafaqat an'anaviy hokimiyat ma'nosida, balki diniy qonuniylik nuqtai nazaridan ham qiyinlashtirmoqda. Bu kabi har qanday da'volar hukumatlar tomonidan mavjud bo'lgan tahdid sifatida qabul qilinadi va boshqa davlatlar tomonidan mintaqaviy yoki xalqaro darajada targ'ib qilingan Islomning har qanday alternativ talqinlaridir.

Maqolada qurolli qarama-qarshiliklar va mojarolarning kuchayishi tahlil qilinmoqda, ularning qo'shni davlatlarga tarqalishi geosiyosiy transformatsiya jarayoni tugaganini va mintaqadagi kuchlarning yangi muvozanati hali aniqlanmaganligini ko'rsatmoqda.

Tayanch so'zlar: Musulmon mamlakatlari, Islom dunyosi, Islom omili, diniy tashkilotlar, "Musulmon Birodarlar", Xamas, "qattiq" va "yumshoq kuch" tushunchasi, "aqli kuch", gibrid urush, Eron, Misr, "Arab bahori", tashqi siyosiy jarayon.

Аннотация: Статья посвящена особенностям внешней политики мусульманских государств, где исламский фактор играет важную роль в жизни общества. Известно, что религиозный фактор проявляется по-разному, в зависимости от исторического наследия, культуры и особенностей социально-политического развития страны. Вместе с тем, он оказывает значительное влияние на внешнюю политику всех мусульманских государств. Так, исламский фактор присутствует как в государственной внешнеполитической стратегии, так и в форме идеологии, продвигаемой негосударственными субъектами.

В государственной политике мусульманских стран, в основном, преобладает идея продвижения именно «своей» местной формы ислама. Его «мягкая сила» после «Арабской весны» стала неотъемлемой частью новой геополитики, и в еще большей степени, чем в прошлом, мусульманские страны пытаются формировать и продвигать свой образ «умеренной» версии ислама и придерживаться его в своей внешней политике.

Автор исследует такие негосударственные акторы, как например, организацию «Братья-мусульмане» или Исламское государство (ИГИЛ), которые подвергают критике существующие режимы мусульманских государств, ставя под сомнение их легитимность. Тем самым бросая вызов существующим режимам не только в традиционном смысле власти, но также с точки зрения религиозной законности. Любые претензии подобного плана воспринимаются правительствами как экзистенциальная угроза, так же как и любые альтернативные трактовки ислама, продвигаемые на региональном или международном уровне другими государствами.

В статье анализируется эскалация вооруженных противостояний и конфликтов, распространение которых на сопредельные страны показывает, что процесс геополитической трансформации пока далек от завершения, а новый баланс сил в регионе пока не определен.

Ключевые слова: мусульманские страны, исламский мир, исламский фактор, религиозные организации, «Братья-мусульмане», ХАМАС, концепция «жесткой» и «мягкой силы», «умная сила», гибридная война, Иран, Египет, «арабская весна», внешнеполитический процесс.

INTRODUCTION

The term “Muslim countries” usually refers to states in which the majority of the population are followers of Islam. According to information from the American Pew Research Center, there are currently 50 such states. According to data from The World Atlas, Muslims make up the majority of the population in 45 countries around the world (Muslim Majority Countries, 2020). The authors of the Encyclopedia Britannica count between 30 and 40 such states (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020).

More broadly, Muslim countries can also include other countries that, for one reason or another, could be included on this list. For example, one criterion might be membership in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). According to the OIC Charter, to join the organization, a state that is a member of the United Nations, has a Muslim majority, and complies with the OIC Charter must submit an application for membership, which must then be approved by consensus of the Council of Foreign Ministers “based on agreed criteria” (Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 2020). Currently, the OIC has 57 member states.

In this context, the term “Muslim states” is closely related to the concept of the “Islamic world”. Leonid Syukiyainen, a renowned Russian expert on Islamic law, notes the appropriateness of using the terms “Islamic” and “Muslim” synonymously, referring to both the

Islamic world and Muslim countries (Syukiyainen L. 2006).

At the same time, it seems appropriate to consider only those states in which Muslims constitute the majority of the population as Muslim countries. Muslim countries thus serve as the foundation of the Islamic world, which possesses a number of specific characteristics that allow us to speak of an entire civilization.

Despite the lack of consensus on the definition of “civilization” in relation to the Islamic world (Syukiyainen L. 2006), the term itself has mainly become established in the scientific world, and is used both in the West (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020). and in Muslim countries (Bassiouni Ch. 2020).

Islamic civilization implies a distinct approach to understanding the world, rooted in religion. Russian orientalists V.Naumkin and A.Kuznetsov note that, based on three key parameters they identified-cultural and political tradition, the image shaped by the West, and the self-identification of Muslim communities living in Europe and America-the Islamic world fully complies with the concept of civilization (Naumkin V., Kuznetsov A. 2013).

A distinctive feature of the Islamic world is the premise that separating the religious from the non-religious is practically impossible, and this speaks, among other things, to the connection between Islam and politics. In other words, “Islam is a crucial element of individual and social behavior, and the way of life in the Muslim world and Muslim countries. It can be said that the state of the Muslim world largely depends on the state of Islam, and vice versa: whatever Islam is today, that is largely the state of the Muslim world” (Syukiyainen L. 2006).

The influence of the Islamic factor is a distinctive feature of the political processes of Muslim countries. Muslim countries use religion to identify themselves within their region and the world. At the same time, the influence of Islam is uneven and depends on the historical past, political system, and political course of the leadership of a particular country.

METHODS

Muslim countries can be roughly divided into those in which the defining role of Islam is legally enshrined; a group of states in which, as a rule, a struggle between secular and religious forces occurs, with varying degrees of success; and secular political systems in which the participation of religious parties or movements in political processes is legally prohibited.

The first group includes Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf monarchies, the Islamic Republic of Iran,

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and several other states. Islam is a fundamental determinant of domestic political processes and foreign policy in these countries. For states such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Islam has become a unifying factor and the rationale for the country's existence. For Iran, Islam assumed a central place in the country's politics after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In Afghanistan, Islamization intensified sharply after the entry of Soviet troops into the country and the threat of the spread of atheistic ideology.

These countries place particular importance on relations with other states in the Islamic world, and Islamic solidarity can serve as the basis for certain foreign policy decisions. The most obvious examples include the Arab-Israeli conflict or the development of cooperation and assistance based on a state's Islamic affiliation. Without taking into account the role of Islam, it is extremely difficult to objectively evaluate the policies of these states. The principle of "Islamic solidarity" serves as a rationale for supporting Islamist movements around the world and as a reason for sending peacekeeping missions within the UN.

Another group of Muslim countries is made up of those where a struggle between religious parties and, to a lesser extent, secular parties and power structures is taking place, with varying degrees of success. Foreign policy directly depends on which forces prevail in this domestic political struggle. These countries include Egypt, Turkey, and many other states in the Islamic world.

For example, in Egypt, the 2011 revolution brought to power a president who supported the "Muslim Brotherhood", a group long persecuted in the country as an extremist group. Following the moderate policies of President Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), the foreign policy of his successor, Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013), bore a clear imprint of Islamist ideology.

Following the 2011 revolution, official state authorities, including the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began replacing advisors from the religious extremist organization the Muslim Brotherhood, who acted more in the interests of the organization than the state. The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in foreign policy decision-making declined significantly, and foreign policy became concentrated in the hands of President Morsi, who in this sense became more dependent on other authorities, especially the security services, in resolving foreign policy issues (Adel El-Adawy. 2013).

From the very first months after the Muslim Brotherhood's supporters came to power, signals began to emerge that Egypt's foreign policy would undergo

radical changes (Adel El-Adawy. 2013). Ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran were restored, and Cairo officially supported the Hamas movement, building on the traditionally good relations between Hamas and the "Muslim Brotherhood". All this led Egyptian experts to characterize the foreign policy of this period as "impulsive, internally contradictory, and almost incomprehensible" (Adel El-Adawy. 2013).

Turkey's foreign policy strategy has changed significantly since Recep Tayyip Erdogan's rise to power. The ideological foundation of his policies and programs is *Neo-Ottomanism*. This ideology has now transformed into a geopolitical paradigm. Historically, the core idea was to unite all ethnic communities, regardless of their ethnic origin or religious affiliation, for the sake of preserving the Ottoman state as a prerequisite for prosperity. Although Neo-Ottomanism is identified with the Ottoman Empire that existed before 1923, its religious roots lie in the title of caliph, borne by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, and, accordingly, in Pan-Islamism.

As a doctrine, Pan-Islamism emerged in the 1870s and 1880s as one of the attempts to prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Islamism advocates the solidarity of the peoples of Muslim countries and their integration into a single, powerful Islamic empire. According to this concept, the empire should encompass Muslims (including those of non-Turkish origin) from the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, Russia, the Caucasus, Iran, and Egypt, as well as other countries. The concept of Pan-Islamism was never realized and remained within the framework of a dream of Muslim unification that never came to fruition (Hristov I. 2019).

Finally, the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan comprise a group of states with secular political systems that legally prohibit the participation of religious parties or movements in political processes.

In these countries, including Uzbekistan, the nature of the political system formally precludes the direct influence of religious organizations on domestic or foreign policy. However, in practice, political participation is simply modified, delegitimized. Therefore, the leadership of these states views any manifestation of overt interference in political processes as a threat to national security.

RESULTS

Due to a specific historical legacy and established political systems, the process of securitization with respect to Islamism occurs naturally. According to the concept of securitization, national security is defined

by how a given threat can be interpreted and accepted as such by society. Regardless of how real a security threat is, it only becomes a threat if the elite perceives it as a threat and publicly conveys this to society, which, in turn, must also accept it. Such securitization is a speech act, including a declaration of an existential threat requiring extraordinary measures (Buzan B. 1983: 106). An example of this in the Muslim states of the post-Soviet space is any form of Islamism, which, in such a situation, excluding any possibility of legitimate political participation, often takes on radical forms.

In general, the Islamic factor manifests itself differently for each of these groups of states. However, they all share the commonality that, to a greater or lesser extent, it exerts a significant influence on foreign policy, serving as a distinctive feature of the foreign policy of Muslim states.

The Islamic factor manifests itself both in foreign policy decision-making and in its implementation. Islam acts as a crucial component of “soft power”.

Theoretically, “soft power” represents a neoliberal vision of influence that differs significantly from the realist view of power. Realists have historically characterized influence as a direct consequence of material resources, primarily military force, economic potential, technology, territory, population, and so on in other words, traditional “hard power” (Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson, 2005:752).

An early version of Nye’s definition of “soft power” was “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion or payment” (Nye J. 2009:73) which implied culture, values, and diplomacy. Nye later expanded his definition to include the ability to influence others through agenda-setting, persuasion, and eliciting positive attraction to achieve preferred outcomes. Soft power, as it evolves and becomes an increasingly influential factor in today’s global information space, serves as a tool for maintaining power.

Islam is actively used by states as both a “soft” and “hard” element of traditional diplomacy. Conflicts between Middle Eastern countries often involve the use of “hard power”. For example, Saudi Arabia is waging war in Yemen against the Houthis, and Turkey is occupying northern Syria.

However, Muslim states have experience and potential in using soft power, as Islam is an important, and in some cases the only, ideology that effectively integrates politics. After the end of the Cold War, the ideas of Islamic socialism declined, as did the ideology of pan-Arabism. Islam has no ideological “competitors” left at the supranational level.

However, both domestically and internationally, Muslim countries must recognize that once Islam

becomes a topic of public debate, how citizens interpret their religion transforms from a private act of faith into a matter of national security. Governments feel compelled to directly engage in debates about the nature of Islam, otherwise they risk leaving an ideological vacuum for their ideological opponents to fill. In other words, domestic disagreements over the role and relevance of Islam in everyday politics shape how states use Islam abroad (Peter Mandaville, Shadi Hamid. 2018).

The use of Islam’s “soft power” has become a tradition among Muslim countries, especially leading ones. Since the 1960s, Saudi Arabia has invested abroad in the construction of mosques, the dissemination of religious texts, and scholarships for students at its universities. This was driven by its position as the “custodian of Muslim holy sites”, its claims to leadership in the Islamic world, and a geopolitical goal that allowed Saudi Arabia to ideologically contrast itself with regional competitors who, during the Cold War, promoted Islamic socialism and secular pan-Arabism, as well as interpretations of Islam that differed from Saudi Arabia’s, such as the ideas of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

A significant role was played by the Saudi royal family and religious establishment’s sense of obligation to spread Islam, which also served as a permanent argument for its use in foreign policy (Peter Mandaville, Shadi Hamid. 2018).

The idea of promoting “one’s own” version of Islam is key to the analysis of the Islamic factor in the foreign policy of Muslim states. However, reducing the Islamic factor to a coordinated foreign policy strategy to promote one’s own version of Islam seems oversimplified.

Thus, in Saudi Arabia, government agencies are only part of the organizations involved; others are private or quasi-governmental entities. Some are funded by the Saudi royal family but are independent from official state authorities. Others are closely linked to influential religious institutions, which may enjoy significant autonomy from the government and the Saudis. In some cases, dissemination occurred through groups and networks located outside Saudi Arabia. The complex of public and private entities forms a system in which the original agenda is transformed and becomes more diffuse (Peter Mandaville, Shadi Hamid. 2018).

The key components of the Saudi system for spreading Islam abroad are the following:

- The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Da’wa, and Guidance, which is primarily responsible for the management of religious affairs and serves as the primary provider of resources (finances, books, personnel) for international proselytizing activities, including the construction of mosques, the development of religious

schools, and the organization of lecture tours. Employees of this ministry act as “religious attaches” at Saudi diplomatic missions abroad, responsible for contacts with local Muslim communities and religious leaders.

- The Muslim World League, an international organization founded in 1962 and funded primarily by Saudi Arabia, with headquarters in Mecca, advocates for the promotion of Muslim solidarity and the spread of Islam throughout the world. Despite the formally welcomed diversity of ideas and broad regional representation within the organization, including, for example, the South Asian organization Jamaat-e Islami, the Muslim World League is characterized by the dominance of Saudi Arabian representatives and the promotion of its interests (Official site of the Muslim World League, 2020).

- The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), an organization founded in 1972, initially aimed at preparing young citizens of Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries for education in non-Muslim settings, primarily in Europe and North America. Over time, the organization’s activities evolved into collaboration with Islamist networks in Europe and other regions of the world. WAMY is more closely aligned with the government and primarily promotes Wahhabi doctrine (Official site of World Assembly of Muslim Youth).

- The Islamic University of Madinah (IUM), founded in 1961 with the aim of providing instruction in classical Islamic sciences to Muslims from around the world. The IUM’s provision of scholarships for foreign students made it an attractive destination for religious studies; it was often viewed as a direct conduit for the export of Wahhabism through the training of religious scholars. However, today, aspects of the curriculum reflect the more diverse cultural backgrounds and theological perspectives of students from around the world (Peter Mandaville, Shadi Hamid. 2018).

There is also a wide range of Saudi and Saudi-funded charities that incorporate elements of proselytism into their aid and social services around the world. The largest organizations here include the Islamic World League’s affiliate, the International Organization for Relief, Welfare, and Development (formerly the International Organization for Islamic Relief), as well as the Al-Haramain Foundation and Al-Waqf al-Islami.

In Iran, the idea of exporting the revolution beyond the country’s borders, as set out in the country’s Constitution, aimed at ultimately “finding a way to form a single global Islamic ummah” (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran) implies the extensive use of “soft power”, or that combination of “soft” and “hard power” that has been called “smart power” (Nye J.2012).

J. Nye noted that the “smart power” strategy can be successfully applied even when physical resources are insufficient. He cited the example of “Qatar, a tiny peninsula near Saudi Arabia, which allowed the American military to use its territory as a staging ground for the invasion of Iraq while simultaneously sponsoring Al Jazeera, the region’s most popular television station, which is highly critical of American actions” (Nye J.2012).

Iran is one of the leading powers in the Middle East, but its capacity for leadership in the Islamic world is limited, especially given that Shiites constitute a relative minority of Muslims. Consequently, Iran’s leadership has developed far more sophisticated means of promoting revolutionary ideas while simultaneously expanding its geopolitical influence. Geopolitical, rather than religious, factors prompted Tehran to forge an alliance with the secular regime in Damascus, but this does not preclude a religious component from the cooperation, and Iran generally views the export of the Islamic revolution in the broadest possible context (Iran’s Politics and Foreign Policy, 2016).

Iran’s appeal is largely based on the ideas of the Islamic Revolution, despite the country’s desire to portray itself primarily as a protector of Shiite minorities. Islam is used as a rationale for military presence abroad. For example, the defense of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria received informal religious legitimization as a pretext for protecting religious sanctuaries and the Muslim population.

Iran’s “soft power” is not based solely on Shia Muslims. The Iranian Revolution was welcomed by Sunni Islamists, who might otherwise have been suspicious of Shia Islam. They saw Iran as a potential ally against their “repressive” regimes. The “Islamic” nature of the Islamic Revolution took precedence over “sectarianism”. “Moderate” Sunni Islamists had more in common with Iran in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant after 2014, even if the struggle in Iraq was effectively led by Iranian proxies, formally answerable to the central government in Baghdad (Peter Mandaville, Shadi Hamid. 2018).

Iran’s “smart power” strategy involved the use of “hybrid warfare” tactics, which were employed during the Cold War in Lebanon and are now being deployed by Tehran from Afghanistan to Syria and Yemen. Hybrid warfare is a form of so-called proxy warfare, or unconventional warfare.

The term hybrid warfare has become widely used both at the official level and in analytical circles. The importance of hybrid warfare is also evidenced by the significant attention it receives within NATO. It is noted that hybrid warfare “involves multi-layered efforts

aimed at destabilizing a functioning state and polarizing its society. Unlike conventional military action, the “center of gravity” in hybrid warfare is the target group. The adversary attempts to influence politicians and key decision-makers by combining kinetic operations with direct, forceful efforts (NATO Review, 2014). The aggressor often resorts to covert action to avoid blame or retaliation”. Such a conflict often develops covertly, so a traditional response may be delayed or inadequate.

DISCUSSION

According to American expert F.Hoffman, who calls such conflicts the wars of the future, the most important principles of hybrid warfare are the following (Frank G. Hoffman, 2007):

- multifaceted and multi-layered focus (omni-directionality). Confrontation requires military commanders to consider the potential battlefield without the preconceptions of traditional strategy and tactics. They must develop a comprehensive plan that utilizes a combination of military and civilian resources. There should be no distinction between what constitutes a battlefield and what does not. In addition to traditional domains-land, sea, air, and outer space-politics, economics, culture, and moral values must be considered as battlefields;

- synchronicity. Military commanders are expected to be prepared to conduct multi-level battles across multiple fields and domains, taking into account the time dimension. Instead of the traditional accumulation of the results of several battles, strategic results can now be achieved quickly through simultaneous action at a specific time;

- asymmetry manifests itself to some extent in all aspects of war, but in hybrid warfare it transcends traditional rules and state borders.

Iran actively uses the Islamic factor in its hybrid wars. During the “Arab Spring”, a network of operations was developed and implemented to expand transnational influence in countries throughout the Middle East, but particularly in the Persian Gulf region.

Iran also works with the public and civil society institutions throughout the Muslim world. In Iraq, for example, Tehran seeks to expand and strengthen ties with the leading Shia educational centers of Najaf and Karbala, supporting pro-Iranian clerics and influencing the occupancy of leadership positions in Iraqi religious institutions.

A distinctive feature of Iran’s soft power strategy is its flexible nature. Even the seemingly rigid interpretation of Shia Islam as the foundation of Iran’s identity by the founder of the Islamic Revolution,

Ayatollah R.Khomeini, is in reality more complex and flexible (Armajani J. 2020: 252).

Iran’s cultural diplomacy relies on a more flexible and less classical Shia teaching, adapting to its audience and drawing on various sources of religious, ethnic, linguistic, and historical legitimacy. When, in order to reach neighboring countries such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan, it was more useful to emphasize ethnic, linguistic, and historical heritage, the Islamic Republic emphasized these aspects. In Indonesia, in 2007, Tehran established an “Iranian Corner” at the Jakarta branch of the Indonesian National Islamic University, establishing a library dedicated to the historical contribution of the Persian people to Sufism, the dominant religious trend at the university and a defining element of Indonesian religious culture (Peter Mandaville, Shadi Hamid, 2018). Similarly, by using religion in Sunni countries, Iran promoted revolutionary Shia Islam.

Iran has also attempted to leverage the Islamic factor through “soft power” at the global level, perhaps most notably through the “Dialogue among Civilizations” initiative at the United Nations.

The primary role of promoting the ideas of the Islamic Revolution through “soft power” is entrusted to the International Organization for Islamic Culture and Relations (ICRO), which performs organizational and coordinating functions, formally affiliated with Iranian embassies but reporting directly to the country’s leader (Official site of Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, 2020).

The official goals of the ICRO are as follows:

- to revive and disseminate Islamic principles and ideas with the goal of conveying the true message of Islam to people around the world;

- to raise awareness among people around the world of the principles and goals of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its role in the world;

- expanding cultural ties with various peoples and communities in general, Muslims and the “oppressed” in particular;

- strengthening and regulating existing cultural ties between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries of the world, as well as global cultural organizations;

- communicating the concept of Iranian culture and civilization, as well as its cultural, geographical, and historical characteristics;

- preparing the “necessary foundation” for unity among Muslims and creating a united front among Muslims worldwide “based on the indisputable principles of Islam”;

- scientific discussions and opposition to “anti-religious, anti-Islamic, and anti-revolutionary cultures” with the aim of “awakening” Muslims around the world

to the “conspiracies of enemies” and defending the rights of Muslims;

- improving the cultural, political, economic, and social conditions of Muslim life (Official site of Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, 2020).

In addition, there are a number of Iranian cultural foundations through which Tehran establishes Islamic universities and seminaries in various countries or provides scholarships for foreign students to study in Iran. Some of these foundations are not limited to Shia communities but also reach out to Sunnis, using conditions that make such assistance acceptable, such as aid to the Gaza Strip under the Imam Khomeini Foundation. In Tajikistan, leveraging linguistic and cultural commonalities, Iran acts as an effective actor countering Sunni foundations, including those from Saudi Arabia.

Iran’s “soft power” emphasizes a “culture of resistance,” that is, positioning itself as a center of opposition to American influence in the Middle East and establishing partnerships between Iran and other states, governmental and non-governmental structures, in many cases with an anti-American orientation, including Russia, Hezbollah, and others (Peter Mandaville, Shadi Hamid. 2018).

The events of September 11, 2001, and then, 10 years later, the Arab Spring and the subsequent emergence of the Islamic State heightened the urgency of debates in Muslim countries about the role of Islam and its interpretations. Various regimes in Muslim countries were criticized by extremist groups who questioned their legitimacy, while in other cases, opposition Islamist movements pushed for reforms that challenged existing regimes not only in the traditional sense of authority but also in terms of religious legitimacy. Any claims of this kind are perceived by governments as an existential threat.

In connection with the sharp intensification of ideological confrontation after 2011, the governments of Muslim states are persistently trying to establish control over religious institutions and promote what can be called “state Islam”-a version of religion that, above all, serves the interests of the state (Peter Mandaville, Shadi Hamid. 2018).

After the Arab Spring, the “soft power” of Islam has become an increasingly important part of the new geopolitics, and even more so than in the past, Muslim countries are attempting to shape religious discourse and control religious knowledge in order to pursue their own national interests. States are increasingly positioning themselves as professing a “moderate” version of Islam.

Thus, in Morocco, the “soft power” of Islam strengthens the regime’s legitimacy by affirming the monarchy’s religious roots and elevates the country’s

prestige in the Islamic world as an important voice of religious “moderation”. In Morocco, the king’s constitutional role as “Amir al-Mu’minin” (from Arabic “ruler of the faithful”), uniting political and spiritual authority, is enshrined. Therefore, questioning the king’s role by any political force is tantamount to heresy (Peter Mandaville, Shadi Hamid. 2018).

In the UAE, following the Arab Spring, considerable attention has been paid to the principle of tolerance. Thus, a special Ministry of Tolerance was created, a National Tolerance Program was launched in 2016, and the International Institute of Tolerance was founded in 2017. As an expression of its “soft power”, Dubai hosts an annual conference on tolerance. The inaugural event, held in 2018, was attended by delegates from 105 countries. Abu Dhabi has also established special relationships with Pope Francis and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar (Egypt), Dr. Ahmad Tayyeb. These measures should establish the UAE as a “global beacon of civilized behavior” (Kourgiotis P., 2019).

Qatar has also developed a special approach to supporting and promoting Islam abroad. Qatar positions itself as a patron of Islamism in the spirit of the Muslim Brotherhood, providing, contrary to the opinion of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, refuge for dissidents and publishing materials in support of the Muslim Brotherhood in a wide range of media outlets under its control (Peter Mandaville, Shadi Hamid. 2018).

A new trend in the contemporary use of Islam in foreign policy can be identified in the fact that various “moderate” versions of Islamism are becoming increasingly numerous and are coming into conflict with each other, influencing regional political processes. In particular, prior to the events of 2011, Saudi Arabia supported and provided refuge and jobs to members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and even promoted them to leadership positions in international religious organizations such as the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. However, after the Muslim Brotherhood, supported by Turkey and Qatar, came to power in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, Saudi Arabia and its allies among the Persian Gulf monarchies began to view the movement as a geopolitical threat. After 2013, when the Muslim Brotherhood was removed from power in Egypt, Cairo joined Riyadh and its allies in condemning and persecuting the Muslim Brotherhood.

In Egypt, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, who replaced Muslim Brotherhood member M.Morsi, called on the Al-Azhar religious complex to renew and modernize its approach to studying and teaching Islam as part of a broader “religious revolution” that could counter both the opposition Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood and the violent, extremist Islam of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.

CONCLUSION

Thus, the Islamic factor is the main distinguishing feature of the foreign policy of Muslim states. Its influence depends on the historical legacy and the specifics of the country's political system. However, all Muslim states share the commonality that Islam, to a greater or lesser degree, exerts a significant influence on their foreign policy processes overall.

After the Arab Spring, the "soft power" of Islam became an even more important part of the new geopolitics of Muslim countries, which are trying to shape and promote their image of a "moderate" version of Islam and adhere to it in their foreign policy.

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