

MISINFORMATION AS A METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE OF INFORMATION (BASED ON MODERN FOREIGN RESEARCH)

DEZINFORMATSIYA AXBOROT PSIXOLOGIK TA'SIR USULI SIFATIDA (ZAMONAVIY XORIJIY TADQIQOTLAR ASOSIDA)

ДЕЗИНФОРМАЦИЯ КАК МЕТОД ПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО ВОЗДЕЙСТВИЯ ИНФОРМАЦИИ (НА ОСНОВЕ СОВРЕМЕННЫХ ЗАРУБЕЖНЫХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ)

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Abstract: This article is based on up-to-date foreign research on the use of misinformation as a tool of psychological influence, which has become the most pressing issue at the moment. In practice, the information provided by the mass media has become a means of influencing its content. Extremely fast-paced images of life, a lack of time to study the events reported by the media, and sometimes a lack of personal skills to analyze these reports have led to a wide audience accepting the material in the same way as media outlets. The article attempts to theoretically comprehend the phenomenon of creating and disseminating "fake news" in the modern media space as well as their impact on the cognitive process. The content of the concept of "fake" in the broad sense of the word is revealed as well as the psychological characteristics of its influence on the human mind. If we consider psychologically the concept of "fake news", then it is defined as "a message stylistically created as real news, but false in whole or in part to manipulate people." The author's classification of "fake news" is presented, which is based on classification criteria such as the ratio of reliable and false information; the reliability of the circumstances of the time and place of the event; the composition of the persons referred to in the "news"; psychological goals of creating and disseminating "news"; the level of perception of the reliability of the "news", as well as the state and change in cognitive processes during the perception of misinformation (fake news). Varieties of "fake news" are illustrated by specific examples from the

media and Internet resources. Psychological information on measures taken to neutralize the impact of "fake news" is presented. The results and conclusions will be used by students, psychologists, and sociologists, as well as members of the media. The rapid development of the Internet and social networks provides ample opportunity for the spread of fake messages on a global scale, which in turn increases the relevance of research in the field of information security.

Keywords: *information, misinformation, fake news, social networks, media influence, scientists, research, theories.*

Аннотация: Mazkur maqolada ayni vaqtda eng dolzarb muammoga aylangan – dezinformatsiya axborot psixologik ta'sir vositasi sifatidagi ilmiy xulosalar zamonaviy xorij tadqiqotlari asosida tadqiq qilingan. Ommaviy axborot vosita(OAV)lari tomonidan berib borilayotgan ma'lumotlar amalda o'z mazmunidan ajrab, ta'sir o'tkazish vositasiga aylanib qoldi. Hayotning nihoyatda jadal suratlar, OAVlari xabar qiladigan voqealarni o'rganishga vaqtning yo'qligi, ba'zida esa bu xabarlarini tahlil etishga shaxs malakasining yetishmasligi shunday holga keldiki, keng auditoriya materiallarni axborot kanallari qay tarzda taqdim etsa, shu zaylda qabul etmoqdalar.

Maqolada «dizinformatsiya»ning media muhitda hosil qilinishi, tarqalishini va ularning kognitiv(bilish) jarayonlariga ta'sirini nazariy anglashga harakat qilingan. «Dezinformatsiy» (Misinformation) atamasini keng ma'nosini to'liq ochib berishga va shuningdek, uning inson ongiga qay darajada ta'sir qilishi va psixologik xususiyatlari tadqiq qilingan. Agar «dezinformatsiya» atamasini nazariy tadqiq etadigan bo'lsak - bu stilistik nuqtayi nazaridan haqiqiydek hosil qilingan xabar bo'lib, aslida esa qisman yoki to'liq yolg'on bo'lib, insonlarni manipulyatsiya qilish uchun hosil qilgan soxta xabarlardir. Yolg'on va haqqoniy xabarlar; vaqt va makon haqiqiyligi nuqtayi nazaridan ma'lumotning haqqoniyligi; yangiliklarning muallifi va manbasi nuqtayi nazaridan; xabarlardagi esga olinuvchi shaxslar nuqtayi nazaridan; yangilikni vujudga keltiruvchi psixologik maqsadlardan kelib chiqqan holda; «yangilik»ni qabul etilishi; dezinformatsion(feyk xabarlar) ma'lumotlarning natijasida inson kognitiv jarayonlari holati va o'zgarishi natijasida feyk xabarlar klassifikatsiyasini taqdim etaman deganidir.

Maqolada internet manbaalar va turli OAV dan yaqqol misollar bilan keltirilgan. «Feyk xabarlar» ning oldini olish va ularni neytralizatsiya qilish uchun psixologik ma'lumotlar keltirilgan. Olingan natija va xulosalardan talabalar, psixolog va sotsiologlar, shuningdek, OAVlari xodimlari foydalanishlari ko'zda tutilgan. Internet va ijtimoiy tarmoqlarning jadal rivojlanishi feyk xabarlarining global miqyosda yoyilishiga keng imkon yaratmoqda va bu o'z navbatida axborot xavfsizligi sohasidagi tadqiqotlarning dolzarbligini oshirmoqda.

Kalit so'zlar: *Dezinformatsiya, fake news, ijtimoiy tarmoq, media ta'sir, axborot, olimlar, tadqiqotlar, nazariyalar.*

Аннотация: Эта статья основана на современных зарубежных исследованиях по использованию дезинфор-

мации в качестве инструмента психологического воздействия, которая стала самой актуальной проблемой на данный момент. На практике информация, предоставляемая средствами массовой информации, стала средством воздействия на ее содержание. Чрезвычайно быстро меняющийся образ жизни, нехватка времени для изучения событий, о которых сообщают СМИ, а иногда и отсутствие личных навыков для анализа этих сообщений, привели к тому, что широкая аудитория воспринимала материал так же, как и средства массовой информации. В статье предпринята попытка теоретического осмысления феномена создания и распространения «фейковых новостей» в современном медиапространстве, а также их влияния на когнитивный процесс. Раскрывается содержание понятия «фейк» в широком смысле слова, а также психологические особенности его влияния на разум человека. Если рассмотреть психологически понятие «фейковая новость», то оно определяется как «сообщение, стилистически созданное как настоящая новость, но ложное полностью или частично чтобы манипулировать людьми». Представлена авторская классификация «фейковых новостей», в основание которой заложены такие классификационные критерии как соотношение достоверной и недостоверной информации, достоверность обстоятельств времени и места произошедшего события, состав лиц, упоминаемых в «новости», психологические цели создания и распространения «новости», уровень восприятия достоверности «новости», а также состояние и изменение когнитивных процессов при восприятии дезинформации (фейковых новостей). Разновидности «фейковых новостей» проиллюстрированы конкретными примерами из СМИ и интернет-ресурсов. Представлена психологическая информация о мерах, предпринимаемых в целях нейтрализации воздействия «фейковых новостей». Результаты и выводы будут использованы студентами, психологами и социологами, а также представителями СМИ. Быстрое развитие интернета и социальных сетей предоставляет широкие возможности для распространения поддельных сообщений в глобальном масштабе, что, в свою очередь, повышает актуальность исследований в области информационной безопасности.

Ключевые слова: информация, дезинформация, поддельные новости, влияние СМИ, социальная сеть, ученые, изучение, теории.

INTRODUCTION

By the middle of the 20th century, numerous researchers were locked in an unsuccessful rummage around for the engram, a speculative memory trace that cleared out an identifiable and permanent physical follow within the brain. The engram was accepted to be both lasting and localizable, two sees that overwhelmed early cognitive neuroscience. The changelessness hypothesis picked up bolster within the 1950s when neurosurgeon Penfield started working on patients with epilepsy. Amid surgery, he kept patients alert but anesthetized them so they may react when he invigorated certain regions of

the brain. He claimed that by utilizing this strategy he got to recollections. The media pounced on this concept and the buildup was communicated to the open as well as to the logical community. The lasting hypothesis was given an enormous boost. In reality, Penfield worked on 1100 patients, and as it were 40 reacted by creating anything like a commemoration reaction when the worldly projection was invigorated. As it were 5 of those 40 detailed a total verbose memory, and a few of these might be ruled out as genuine recollections by other prove. When Elizabeth Loftus and her colleagues (Loftus, 1975; Loftus, Mill operator, & Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974) claimed that people's recollections are flexible after introduction to deluding post-event data, the social and hypothetical suggestions of this finding caused a whirlwind of intrigue within the deception impact. In their unique considers, Loftus and colleagues illustrated how to address wording and the presentation of deluding post-event data impact what is recollected. In one study, Loftus (1975) appeared members a film of a vehicle mischance, and after that inquired half of them, "How quick was the white sports car going when it passed the animal dwelling place whereas voyaging along the national road?" No animal dwelling place appeared within the film; be that as it may, numerous of the members who had been asked about the animal dwelling place claimed to have seen it within the film. In another consider, members replied one of them taking after questions approximately a car mischance portrayed in a film that they had seen: (1) How fast were the cars going when they hit each other? or (2) How fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other? (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). The researchers found that the latter question produced higher speed estimates than did the former question. Simply changing the word "hit" to "smashed into" affected the subject witnesses' memory for the original event. In another study, participants watched a slide sequence involving a car/pedestrian accident. In the slide sequence, a car arrives at an intersection, turns right, and hits a pedestrian. A yield sign was misinformation effect 347 shown to half the participants, while a stop sign was shown to the remaining participants. Later, some participants were asked a question containing a misleading suggestion about either a stop sign or a yield sign (whichever sign they had not seen in the slide sequence). When tested for their memory of the original slides they had seen, many of the misled participants mistakenly claimed that they had seen the sign that had been suggested, rather than the sign that they had seen (Loftus et al., 1978). These studies demonstrate that misleading post-event information affects what people erroneously report about the past.

PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

Study of socio-psychological features of desinformation, which has now become a tool of information and psychological influence, through modern foreign research.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

In the wake of more than 30 years of research, and ever-growing literature continues to demonstrate the distorting effects of misleading postevent information on memory for words, faces, and details of witnessed events (see Loftus, 2005, for a review of the misinformation effect). In a typical misinformation experiment, research subjects are shown materials (e.g., photographs) and are then exposed to deliberately misleading information about what they saw. In a final testing phase, many subjects will inadvertently incorporate elements from the misleading information into their memory for the source material. For example, Stark, Okado, and Loftus (2010) showed subjects a series of photographs that depicted a man stealing a woman's wallet and hiding it in his jacket pocket. Later, subjects heard recorded heard the slides. Embedded in the narratives were narrative sees of misleading information (e.g., "Then the man hid the wallet in his pants pocket"). Finally, subjects were asked questions about details from the photographs, photographs did the thief hide the woman's wallet?" A sub wallet number of those subjects, not only reported the wallet in his pants pocket but they also reported they also remembered that information from the photographs, the photographs give. No one is safe to the misshapen for the impacts of misinformation. Building on the grown-up writing, deception impacts have been gotten have been subject tests, counting infants (Rovee-Collier, Borza, Adler, & Boller, 1993), and indeed animals (e.g., animals, Meissner, Hoffman, Evans, & Frazier, 2004). In any case, there's proof that certain proofs of people are part people defenseless to deception impacts. For instance, executor instance youthful children, and the elderly are more susceptible to susceptible youths and grown-ups (see Davis & Loftus, 2005). Moreover particularly helpless are subjects who report slips who report and consider (Wright & Livingston-Raper, 2002). What do these discoveries tell us almost the underlying components driving the deception impact? One argument is the argument tuition of cognitive assets requires an increased demean increased outside prompts to reproduce memories of memories (2005) focuses out, deception effects are fewer effects are to get when subjects' attentional assets are limited. Essentially, individuals who see themselves to be forgetful and who encounter memory slips may be less able (or willing) to depend on their claim recollections as the sole source of data as they rationally reproduce an event. Recently,

two major thinks about containing more than 400 subjects have investigated cognitive capacity and identity components as predictors of vulnerability to deception. In each study, subjects saw slides of two wrongdoings and afterward examined narratives of the wrongdoings that contained deception. Those subjects who had higher insights scores, more noteworthy perceptual abilities, greater working memory capacities and more prominent performance on confront acknowledgment errands tended to stand up to deception and produce less untrue recollections. Certain personality characteristics were too appeared to be associated with wrong memory arrangement, especially in people with lesser cognitive capacity. Particularly, people moo in fear of negative assessment and hurt evasion, and those tall in cooperativeness, compensate reliance, and self-directedness were related with expanded powerlessness to misinformation impacts. In other words, it appears that personality factors may be supportive in understanding the pro-cesses basic memory mutilation taking after presentation to misinformation but less so in people with predominant cognitive capacity. These intelligent may offer assistance to clarify why individual contrast comes about and has not continuously duplicated in false memory investigate.

DISCUSSION

Almost the same time as the primary deception considers were being distributed, we saw a rising concern for the unwavering quality of onlooker declaration. This was a vital commonsense suggestion. Before long from there on, a critical hypothetical issue emerged. The exceptional nature of memory was present in the address. When members had seen a halt sign but gotten a proposal about a yield sign, and after that claimed that they saw a abdicate sign, what had happened to the halt sign in their memory? Was it still there, but perhaps harder to recover? Was it deleted or changed within the preparation of retaining the suggestive data? McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) assaulted the memory impairment speculations claiming, "misleading post-event data has no impact on memory for the first event" (p. 2). The deception comes about were not in address, but the elucidation and method were. McCloskey and Zaragoza's key contentions included the method utilized in these considers. They contended that the acknowledgment of deception happened since

- members never encoded the first data and recalled the post-event information;
- members encoded both the first and the post-event data and thought almost what to report, eventually falling influence to the social allure predisposition;
- the initial data was fair overlooked.

McCloskey and Zaragoza proposed a more fitting method in an endeavor to account for members who may

drop into any of the over categories. They conducted six tests using both this modern method and the initial. The altered test strategy was indistinguishable to the initial strategy but that the test was diverse. The first method has participants select from either the initial event/item or the deceiving event/item. Within the altered method, members are asked to select between the initial event/item and a novel event/item. The misleading data isn't an alternative. McCloskey and Zaragoza hypothesized that if the deluding data changes memory for the initial occasion when that data was not a choice at test, memory for the initial data would be chosen less frequently than chosen by those within the control condition. Collapsing over various tests, McCloskey and Zaragoza effectively duplicated the deception impact utilizing the initial method. Participants in the control condition correctly reported the original information 72% of the time whereas the misled participants correctly reported the original information only 37% of the time. However, the results looked quite different in the modified procedure. Here, Controls correctly reported the original information 75% of the time, while Misled participants correctly reported the original information 72% of the time. The researchers' conclusions were direct:

We conclude from these results that misleading post-event information does not impair participants' ability to remember what they originally saw. In other words, misleading information neither erases the original information nor renders it inaccessible. (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985, p. 7). McCloskey and Zaragoza need to clarify these come about with components other than memory disability, particularly, either assignment requests, or key impacts. Zaragoza, McCloskey, and Jamis (1987) continued to test the altered and unique strategies with a review instead of acknowledgment and upheld their conviction that contrasts between the misled and control conditions within the unique method are due to components other than the impedance of memory. McCloskey and Zaragoza attest that the test ought to be such that process-of-elimination methodologies can be controlled. More later tests outlined to diminish or dispense with key impacts have illustrated the impacts of impaired memory (see Ayers & Reder, 1998, for the survey). Also, the adjusted test may be heartless to memory impedance. When in general memory execution is moor, the impact may require the extra quality of the introduction to the deceiving data once again at the test. It appears that each of the clarifications advertised accounts for a few of the discoveries, but as however we have not created a hypothesis to clarify all of the comes about. Metcalfe (1990, in Ayers & Reder, 1998, p. 19) proposed her CHARM hypothesis, a memory show that accounts for the deception information by implies of memory follow modification. This is often a single-trace

demonstrate that clarifies the coordinates and mixed memory information but falls brief of clarifying the little impacts in some cases seen utilizing the altered strategy. Ayers and Reder (1998) proposed an activation based model that might explain the various misinformation effect findings in terms of a source of activation confusion (SAC) model of memory. This multi-trace model predicts that in our classic misinformation example, a participant might be

aware of the high activation of the concept "yield sign", but be unaware of the reason that it was activated. The yield sign would be more highly activated at Misinformation effect 351 test than the original stop sign because it had been activated more recently. This model is consistent with the ideas expressed by Kelley and Jacoby (1996) that, under some conditions, the source of activation is unclear. If the source is either unavailable or unknown, it may be misattributed, resulting in memory errors. This model is, however, at direct odds with an integration/ blending theory. If the memory trace is altered or overwritten, there can be no source misattribution because there is only one source. In summary, "Although the misinformation effect is easily replicated, the explanation of such memory errors is hotly contested" (Hyman & Pentland, 1996, p. 101). Nowadays, there appears to be an agreement among cognitive analysts that no single handle is capable of all of the deception impacts. The wrangle about includes a few diverse clarifications for the comes about. Whereas a few support the disability speculation, others support the co-existence speculation. Whichever see is adjust, the deception impact information back the reconstructive nature of memory and outline how this recreation takes off memory vulnerable to mistakes.

Within the wake of more than 30 a long time of the investigation, a growing literature proceeds to illustrate the mutilating impacts of misleading postevent data on memory for words, faces, and points of interest of seen occasions (see Loftus, 2005, for a survey of the deception impact). In a normal deception experiment, investigate subjects are appeared materials (e.g., photographs) and are at that point uncovered to purposely deceiving information about what they saw. In the last testing stage, numerous subjects will incidentally consolidate components from the misleading information into their memory for the first source material. For illustration, Stark, Okado, and Loftus (2010) appeared subjects arrangement of photos that portrayed a man taking a woman's wallet and stowing away it in his coat stash. Later, subjects heard recorded narratives describing the slides. Embedded in the narratives were several pieces of misleading information (e.g., "Then the man hid the wallet in his pants pocket"). Finally, subjects were asked questions about details from the photographs, such as

“Where did the thief hide the woman’s wallet?” A substantial number of those subjects not only reported that the thief hid the wallet in his pants pocket but they also reported that they remembered that information from the photographs, not the narratives. Nobody is immune to the distorting effects of misinformation. Building on the adult literature, misinformation effects have been obtained in myriad subject samples, including infants (Rovee-Collier, Borza, Adler, & Boller, 1993), and even animals (e.g., Schwartz, Meissner, Hoffman, Evans, & Frazier, 2004). Nonetheless, there is evidence that certain types of people are especially vulnerable to misinformation effects. For instance, very young children and the elderly are more susceptible to misinformation than adolescents and adults (see Davis & Loftus, 2005). Too particularly helpless are subjects who report slips in memory and consideration (Wright & Livingston-Raper, 2002). What do these discoveries tell us almost the underlying components driving the deception impact? One argument is that the destitution of cognitive assets requires an increased dependence on outside prompts to recreate memories of occasions. As Loftus (2005) focuses out, deception effects are simpler to get when subjects’ attentional assets are limited. So also, individuals who see themselves to be forgetful and who encounter memory slips may be less able (or willing) to depend on their claim recollections as the sole source of data as they rationally remake an event. Recently, two major ponderers containing more than 400 sub-jects have investigated cognitive capacity and identity variables as predictors of defenselessness to deception. In each study, subjects saw slides of two wrongdoings and afterward examined narratives of the wrongdoings that contained deception. Those subjects who had higher insights scores, more noteworthy perceptual abilities, greater working memory capacities and more prominent performance on confront acknowledgment assignments tended to stand up to deception and produce less wrong recollections (Zhu Y., 2010a). Certain personality characteristics were too appeared to be associated with untrue memory arrangement, especially in people with lesser cognitive capacity. Particularly, people too in fear of negative assessment and hurt evasion, and those tall in cooperativeness, compensate reliance, and self-directedness were related with expanded helplessness to misinformation impacts (Zhu Y., 2010b). In other words, it appears that personality factors may be accommodating in understanding the processes fundamental memory mutilation taking after the introduction to misinformation but less so in people with predominant cognitive capacity. These intelligent may offer assistance to clarify why individual contrast comes about and has not continuously reproduced in false

memory investigate. Many factors influence the effectiveness of misinformation. First, the passage of time renders the original memoryless accessible, thereby allowing misinformation to “creep in” undetected. Second, the subtler the inconsistencies are between the first data and the post-event data, the more grounded the deception impact. Third, the more uninformed one is of the possibly deceiving impacts of post-event data, the more vulnerable one will be to the deception impact. Who is vulnerable to the deception impact? Maybe the biggest deception ponderers ever conducted gives an understanding into fair who is most likely to acknowledge deception (Loftus, Levidow, & Duensing, 1992). At a science gallery in San Francisco, roughly 2000 guests taken an interest in a commonplace deception think about. Members saw a brief film and after that, a few of the members were given deception whereas others were not. All of the members at that point replied questions approximately the film. Whereas the lion’s share of deception thinks about have been conducted in college research facilities with college understudies, this specific think about included individuals extending in age from 5 to 75 a long time, giving an interesting opportunity to assemble data on the impact of age and deception. Reliable with other thinks about including children (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987), the most youthful members appeared expansive deception impacts. Furthermore, the elderly appeared an expansive deception impact, as well (Loftus et al., 1992). The going before dialog has centered essentially on the truth that memory details are delicate to deception. For illustration, unpretentious word choice inserted inside post-event data can impact memory. Such memory twisting can be 352 Pickrell, Bernstein, Loftus seen indeed in exceedingly notable recollections, or recollections that a few scholars have named “flashbulb memories” for their profoundly enthusiastic, significant, and subjectively lasting nature. In addition to changing memory for details, misinformation can also change entire memories. In one study, 25% of participants either partially or wholly accepted the false suggestion that they had been lost in a shopping mall at the age of 5 (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Likewise, Hyman, Husband, and Billings (1995) convinced many of their participants that, as children, they had knocked over a punch bowl at a wedding and spilled punch on the bride’s parents. Both studies utilized a procedure in which the researchers acquired three true memories from the participants’ parents. The analysts at that point given members with the genuine recollections and the untrue memory. Members were inquired to undertake to keep in mind the occasions and to depict them in detail. Not as it was about one-quarter of the members come to accept that the untrue occasion had happened, but they too expounded on the wrong

occasion (e.g., “I do keep in mind her [an elderly woman] inquiring me in case I was misplaced, . . . and asking my title and after that saying something approximately taking me to security”, Loftus & Pickrell, 1995, p. 724). There are, of course, other ways to extend one’s certainty in different childhood occasions. Taunt identity profiles and dream elucidations are methods that utilize the power of proposal to extend one’s subjective certainty in occasions that never really happened. Members could be told that their identity profiles uncover that, as youthful children, they had been assaulted by a puppy. Or a dream “expert” might translate a dream as meaning that, as a young child, one had to be protected by a lifeguard. Such deception can increment participants’ certainty within the basic occasions (Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz, & Lynn, 1999). Another frame of proposal utilized to blow up certainty in childhood occasions includes envisioning in detail an occasion that never happened. For illustration, Garry, Keeping an eye on, Loftus, and Sherman (1996) inquired members around an assortment of childhood occasions, counting whether they had broken a window with their hand. Another, a few members were inquired to assume in detail running through the house as a child, and stumbling, falling, and breaking a window with their hand, cutting themselves and dying. This sort of creative energy works out essentially expanded participants’ certainty that the occasion in address happened in their childhood. Extra investigation on “imagination inflation” has set up the utility of this strategy. More later procedures have moreover been created. Drivdahl and Zaragoza (2001) inquired members to see a film delineating a bank robbery. Members at that point studied a story of the occasion that contained deceiving proposals, in expansion to questions outlined to produce perceptual elaboration of details for occasions that were not within the film. For instance, a participant answers specific questions about the physical appearance or location of a suggested but false event (“Was the ring that the thief stole in a box?”). By focusing on perceptual details, the participant creates an image of the scene, imbuing it with life. This perceptual elaboration, in turn, increased participants’ confidence in the false event.

Another later strategy utilized to form untrue recollections includes modified photos. Swim, Garry, Examined, and Lindsay (2002) inquired members around an assortment of childhood occasions, counting riding in a hot discussion swell. The analysts at that point gotten childhood photos of their members and embedded these pictures into a photo portraying a hot discuss swell ride. After members saw themselves riding in a hot discussion swell, they started to “remember” the ride, indeed although the involvement had been fabricated.

RESULTS

We know that there are consequences of true experiences that we no longer remember. One of us (JP) knows firsthand of an individual (her daughter) who retained her fear of dogs long after she had forgotten having been attacked by a large dog when she was 2 years old. What if the daughter had had a false belief about being attacked? Would this also lead to a similar kind of lingering fear? More generally are there long-range consequences associated with the planting of false beliefs or memories? If a person comes to believe they were attacked by a dog while a young child, might they be more inclined as an adult to own a cat instead of a dog? To address this issue a ponder was planned in our lab and carried out by Collins (2001) a portion of her senior respects proposal. The address tended to within the consideration is whether there are unquestionable results to having an untrue memory. In this case, the wrong memory was one of being assaulted by a little pooch. Basic brain research understudies at the College of Washington completed a pre-test where they were inquired how certain they were that each of 58 life occasions had happened to them in their childhood. Furthermore, members completed an inclination survey on which they have shown their inclination towards certain things, such as what kind of pet they might like to claim and what breed of pooch they favored. Participants who indicated with a low rating that it was highly unlikely they “Were unexpectedly attacked by a small dog” were contacted and asked to participate in a future experiment for additional credit. For Session 2, those in the experimental group returned to the laboratory and were told that their responses on various personality scales during the pre-testing indicated that, as young children, they likely had been attacked by a small dog. Those assigned to the control condition participated in other unrelated experiments during Session 2. During Session 3, all participants returned to the laboratory to complete the post-test questionnaires, identical in content to the pre-test questionnaire, but this time administered on computers. Members who initially claimed not to have been assaulted by a little canine as children were driven to accept that they had, in truth, been assaulted. Essentially telling members that their introductory reactions were characteristic of somebody who had been assaulted by a puppy as a child altogether expanded their certainty that they had been assaulted. What is maybe more astounding and chilling, even though, is that these members were less likely to claim to need to claim a canine as a pet after accepting the wrong criticism. The comes about of this try illustrate that not as it were is it conceivable to extend people’s convictions on a completely wrong occasion, but that

this wrong conviction can go with by critical, negative results. Given these discoveries, it moreover ought to be hypothetically conceivable to change one's memory and to emphatically impact one's states of mind.

Braun (1999) inspected the impacts of deception, within the frame of notice, on one's consequent memory for the taste of orange juice. Braun inquired members to taste orange juice and to portray its enhance. A few members at that point assessed the viability of a wrong notice that portrayed the orange juice that they had tasted 15 minutes before being "sweet, thick and pure" (p. 323). The deception in this promotion significantly altered participants' recollections many minutes afterward for the initial orange juice that they had tasted. Particularly, the wrong promotion made members think that the orange juice that they had tasted prior was way better than it in truth had been. The comes about of Braun's work and the dog-bite think about that we examine over recommend that it is conceivable to modify a genuine memory and to plant a wrong memory, with either positive or negative results.

What is not clear from the work described up to this point are the precise boundary conditions of the misinformation effect and the underlying mechanism responsible for memory distortion. Some have investigated the limits to what types of memories can be created through suggestions or imagination. Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997) may not persuade their members that they had gotten a bowel purge as a child. Mazzoni, Loftus, and Kirsch (2001) have contended that an occasion must be seen as conceivable within the rememberer's culture which it must be seen as actually conceivable sometime recently the individual comes to join the involvement into his/her claim personal memory. One conceivable component that might clarify memory mutilation after distinctive shapes of deception is that of nature (Garry et al., 1996). Larry Jacoby and colleagues (e.g., Jacoby, Kelly, & Dywan, 1989) have contended that numerous untrue recollections emerge through the misattribution of nature. Agreeing to this idea, when members fluidly prepare an occasion or involvement, they encounter a feeling of nature. They at that point look for reasons that might clarify this handling familiarity. In case they are incapable to identify an self-evident source, they may quality the familiarity with past involvement. Nature attribution may offer assistance to clarify why individuals acknowledge deception and why they increment their certainty for childhood occasions after envisioning these occasions or after being told that the occasions likely happened. In such cases, individuals will prepare the envisioned or recommended occasion more easily than they would something else have handled it. They will, in turn, evaluate their present processing experience.

Instead of correctly focusing on the misinformation, the imagination exercise, or the suggestion as to the source of familiarity, they mistakenly attribute the familiarity to their childhood.

Tragically, it is exceptionally troublesome to tell whether a person's memory is genuine or envisioned. In truth, inquire about over the past 20 a long time proposes that it is essentially outlandish to decide whether or not a specific memory is genuine. In one consider, Loftus and Pickrell (1995) compared subjects' reports for genuine and wrong recollections. The members utilized more words when portraying their genuine recollections, and appraised the clarity of their genuine recollections higher than they evaluated the clarity of their untrue recollections. Certainty evaluations uncovered that individuals were less certain in their untrue recollections than they were in their genuine recollections. Hyman and Pentland (1996) utilized a worldview comparable to that of Loftus and Pickrell to examine the part that mental symbolism plays within the creation of wrong recollections. After effectively planting untrue recollections, extra questions were inquired in an endeavor to compare recuperated genuine recollections with untrue recollections. True memories that were never recovered or those remembered all along were different from those recovered. The emotional strength of the false memories was comparable to the recovered true memories; the clarity ratings for these two groups were also in the same range. Additionally, the confidence ratings were similar between these two groups. Hyman and Pentland (1996, p.111) claims, "The overall pattern of ratings leads us to two conclusions. First, it will be difficult to discern any differences between recovered true memories and created false memories. Second, one reason for this difficulty may be that the recovered true memories are creations as well." Roediger and McDermott (1995) created false memories for words not presented in lists. Not as it were untrue recollections as common as genuine recollections within the ponder, but members communicated as much certainty in their wrong recollections as they did in their genuine recollections. Maybe indeed more annoying to those who trust to be able to precisely recognize genuine and wrong recollections, members claimed to "remember" (or rationally to remember) the encounter of having listened words sometime recently that they had not listened. In this way, untrue recollections were effectively made, and they were essentially undefined from the genuine recollections. Watchman, Yuille, and Lehman (1999) examined whether phenomenological and substance highlights may segregate between genuine and wrong recollections, in an exertion to efficiently survey the validity of childhood recollections. Porter et al. employed the Memory Assessment

Procedure (MAP) criteria. This consists of seven items designed to record phenomenological (subjective) features, and five items designed to record the specific features of memories. Content analysis revealed that participants rated true memories as more vivid/clear and more detailed. Participants also expressed more confidence in true memories when compared to the implanted memories. No difference was measured in stress levels. Additionally, 40% of participants recalled the real memory from a participant perspective. That is to say, they “re-experienced the event from their own eyes” (p. 28). The remaining 60% of participants viewed the real memory from the observer perspective, meaning they could view themselves as if watching a movie. The percentages were exactly reversed when participants recalled the implanted memory: 60% saw it from the participant perspective and 40% from the observer perspective. Although this was not a reliable difference, it does suggest that real and false memories may differ in terms of their phenomenological and content features. Heaps and Nash (2001) conducted another recent examination of differences between true and false memories. A variety of the Loftus and Pickrell worldview was utilized in arrange to plant untrue recollections in members. In other words, they utilized data from relatives to recommend to individuals that they had had certain encounters. The analysts duplicated the fundamental finding of more prominent detail recollected for the genuine recollections when compared to the wrong recollections. On to begin with the pass, the genuine recollections showed up diverse from the wrong recollections, since they were appraised as being more critical, more sincerely strongly, and more ordinary, and as having clearer symbolism. These refinements were killed when practice recurrence was used as a covariate within the measurable examinations. This proposes that expanded practice shifts the untrue memory closer to the recollective involvement of genuine recollections. The last perception concerned the results of the target occasion. Untrue recollections contained fewer data around any results of the occasion. The move into the legitimate field will slack behind the science. Heaps and Nash (2001) illustrate the problem, “. . . the possibility [exists] that repeated remembering of false memories over greater periods [longer than 3 weeks] may make the recollective experience more complete and more like that found in true autobiographical memories” (p. 17). Few things are more rehearsed than legal testimony, traumatic memories, and events made important by police and legal proceedings. Currently, external corroboration remains the only reliable way to determine the veracity of memory. Finally, there have been recent attempts to distinguish true from false memories at the physiological level using highly sophisticated

brain-imaging techniques such as event-related potentials (ERPs), Positron Emission Tomography (PET), and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). If different “sensory signatures” in the brain can be used to differentiate true and false memories, then these physiological differences might hold great promise to memory researchers (Fabiani, Stadler & Wessels, 2000). To date, the comes about of this line of investigation are blended. Maybe most imperatively, current brain-imaging strategies are most solid when detailing bunch midpoints. Bunch midpoints, whereas important sources of data, tell the memory analyst exceptionally small approximately the genuine or deceptive quality of a specific memory. While assessing the reliability of brainwave activity measured with an electroencephalograph (EEG), Hassett (1978) reported that one group of researchers may have put it best when they said, “we are like blind men trying to understand the workings of a factory by listening outside the walls” (as cited in Kasson, 2001, p. 51).

CONCLUSION

What is obvious from the heap ponders conducted within the range of memory twisting, and particularly those investigating the parameters of the deception impact is that deception can lead to memory changes extending from miniature subtle elements of occasions to memory for whole untrue occasions. Whereas the deception impact is an amazingly vigorous marvel, it can influence individuals in several ways. It can include memory, it can fair alter what individuals report, and it now and then shows up to lead to impedances in already put away recollections. The current comparison of genuine and wrong recollections appears to us that in common, the phenomenological encounters of both sorts of memory are vague. Whereas a few think about point to members being clearer and more sure in their genuine recollections (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Doorman et al., 1999), others report less recognizable prove (Loads & Nash, 2001; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Together with mechanical propels in brain-imaging strategies comes the potential to recognize between genuine and untrue recollections at a physiological level. The capacity to decide the “true” nature of memory and precisely which ranges of the brain are enacted amid the recollecting handle holds guarantee for both the court and the therapist’s office. Loads and Nash (2001) appeared that untrue recollections contained less data approximately results of the wrong occasion when compared to the results uncovered when the memory was genuine.

Future investigation on the results of memory twisting may moreover open a window on the issue of recognizing genuine from wrong recollections. The dog-

bite think about talked about here outlines an ignored control inalienable within the acknowledgment of deception, specifically the results of such conduct. The connected viewpoints are imperative as we see at not as it were the lawful suggestions but moreover potential results beneath less extreme circumstances. They have to understand false memory reports and the effect on regular activities

gets to be more imperative when we realize we are all vulnerable to deception in myriad ways. And given that we will manipulate positive occasions coming about in positive results as well as negative, there may be restorative suggestions whereby changes in memory and affiliations can be useful in changing future behaviors.

The rapid spread of a growing threat to the democratic process and can have serious consequences for evidence-based decision making on a variety of societal issues, ranging from climate change and vaccinations to international relations. In some countries, the rapid spread of online misinformation is posing an additional, physical danger, sometimes leading to injury and even death. Social media platforms have proven to be a particularly fertile breeding ground for online misinformation.

- The misinformation effect occurs when a person receives post-event information (e.g., new information after the original event) that interferes with the person's ability to accurately recall the original event.

- The misinformation effect is a very robust phenomenon.

- The underlying cognitive mechanism remains less clear. As an explanation, cognitive theories claim that either the original memory trace is altered or the original memory trace remains intact but inaccessible.

- The effect has been found with a variety of materials and experimental procedures, ranging from changing details of an event to planting false memories of an entire event.

- The consequences of memory distortions have important implications for several applied problems.

- As yet, we have no reliable means of distinguishing true from false memories.

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