IBN SINA AND HIS PHILOSOPHY OF INTERPRETING QURANIC SURAHS

ИБН СИНО ВА УНИНГ ҚУРЬОН СУРАЛАРИНИ ТУШУНИШ ФАЛСАФАСИ

ИБН СИНА И ЕГО ФИЛОСОФИЯ ТОЛКОВАНИЯ СУР КОРАНА

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DOI: 10.47980/IIAU/2026/3/2

Annotation: *This article examines and analyzes Ibn Sina's Qur'anic exegesis, with particular focus on the role and function of the human soul and its relationship with the Supreme Being (Allah). Ibn Sina's approach to interpreting these Qur'anic surahs may be described as a rational-philosophical method, also referred to as manhaj al-ijtihad al-aqli (the method of rational reasoning). This study focuses on the existence and potential of the human soul, which ultimately originates from and returns to Allah, the Absolute Being, as well as on the manner in which it lives and develops in this transient world. The analysis concludes that Ibn Sina's rational-psychological interpretation is the first in the history of tafsir. This conclusion also serves as a rebuttal to allegations that Ibn Sina's Qur'anic exegesis is misleading and leads Muslims away from the principles of Islamic faith. The study employs scientific methods such as rational and historical approaches, as well as analytical inquiry.*

Ibn Sina developed his Qur'anic exegesis out of a desire to reconcile philosophical convictions with religious teachings, seeking to bridge the apparent differences between the Qur'an and philosophical theories. His method involved a thorough analysis of Qur'anic texts through a philosophical lens, wherein he often employed philosophical insights to interpret legal passages. He emphasized that Allah had placed symbolic expressions in the Qur'an to reveal profound truths that could be fully understood only by those possessing knowledge. The scholar maintained that these sacred texts functioned as a kind of hidden code, comprehensible only to a select group of individuals, including those with intellectual capacities comparable to his own. However, this approach raised concerns that, by increasingly expanding the interpretation of these symbols within his own philosophical framework, he might depart from the fundamental essence of religion and the spiritual character of the Holy Qur'an.

This study aims to: 1) analyze Ibn Sina's methodology to assess how his philosophical insights influence his interpretation of key verses and legal passages; 2) compare his interpretations with those of other scholars, such as Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, to highlight differences in their philosophical frameworks and implications for Qur'anic understanding; and 3) evaluate the potential effects of Ibn Sina's interpretations on the spiritual essence of the Qur'an, considering whether his philosophical lens aligns with or detracts from the core religious messages of the text. The findings provide a deeper understanding of Ibn Sina's distinctive methods and approaches to interpreting the Qur'an.

Keywords: *Ibn Sina, Quranic philosophy, Sura Al-Ikhlas, Sura an-Nur, Sura an-Nas, Sura al-falaq, psychological views, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi.*

Annotatsiya: *Ushbu maqolada Ibn Sinoning Qur'on tafsirida inson uchun ruhning o'rni va vazifasi hamda uning Oliy Zot (Alloh taolo) bilan aloqasi o'rganilib, tahlil qilingan. Ibn Sinoning ushbu suralarni tafsir qilishda qo'llagan usuli ratsional-falsafiy yoki manhaj al-ijtihod al-aqliy (aqliy ijtihod yo'li) deb ham atash mumkin. Ushbu tadqiqotda mutlaq Zot bo'lgan Alloh taologa borib taqaladigan inson ruhining mavjudligi, uning salohiyati va bu foniy dunyoda qanday yashashiga qaratilgan. Tahlillar shuni ko'rsatadiki, Ibn Sinoning ratsional-psixologik tafsiri oziga xos uslubda yozilgan. Ushbu xulosa, shuningdek, Ibn Sinoning tafsiri adashtiruvchi va musulmonlarni islom e'tiqodidan uzoqlashtiruvchi degan ayblovlarga ham raddiya o'laroq javob bo'ladi. Ushbu tadqiqotda ratsional va tarixiy yondashuv hamda tahlil kabi ilmiy uslublar qo'llanilgan.*

Ibn Sino o'z tafsirini falsafiy e'tiqodlarni diniy ta'limotlar bilan birlashtirish istagidan kelib chiqqan holda yozgan, Ibn Sino Qur'on va falsafiy nazariyalar o'rtasidagi ko'rinib turgan tafovutlarni yaqinlashtirishga intildi. Uning uslubi Qur'on matnlarini falsafiy nuqtai nazardan chuqur tahlil qilishni o'z ichiga olgan bo'lib, u ko'pincha huquqiy va aqliy tafakkurga olib keladigan oyatlarni talqin qilishda falsafiy tushunchalardan foydalangan. Alloh taolo Qur'onda ramziy iboralarni joylashtirganini, ularni faqat ilm ahllarigina tushunish mumkin bo'lgan chuqur haqiqatlarni ochib berishini ta'kidlagan. Alloma bu muqaddas bitiklar o'zi kabi sanoqli kishilar tomonidan tushuniladigan maxfiy kodlar vazifasini o'taganini taxmin qilgan. Biroq, bu yondashuv uning ushbu ramzlarni o'zining falsafiy doirasida kengaytirib borishi sababli dinning asosiy mohiyati va muqaddas Qur'onning ma'naviy xususiyatlaridan chetga chiqish xavotirlarini keltirib chiqardi.

Ushbu tadqiqot quyidagilarni maqsad qiladi: 1) Ibn Sinoning falsafiy qarashlari uning asosiy oyatlar va huquqiy tafakkurga yo'naltiradigan oyatlarni talqin qilishiga qanday ta'sir qilishini tahlil qilish; 2) Oyatlarning falsafiy doiralaridagi farqlarni va Qur'onni tushunishdagi ahamiyatini yoritib berish orqali Imom Faxriddin ar-Roziy kabi boshqa olimlarning qarashlari bilan taqqoslash; 3) Ibn Sino qarashlarining Qur'onning ma'naviy mohiyatiga falsafiy ta'sirini baholash, uning falsafiy qarashlari Qur'on matnining asosiy mazmuniga mos kelishi yoki kelmasligini ko'rib chiqish. Olingan xulosalar Ibn Sinoning Qur'onni tushinishda o'ziga xos uslublardan foydalanganligini teran tushinish imkonini beradi.

Калит сўзлар: *Ibn Sino, Qur'on falsafasi, Nur surasi, Nos surasi, Falaq surasi, falasafiy qarashlar, Faxriddin Roziy*

Аннотация. *В статье рассматривается философский подход Ибн Сины к толкованию сур Священного Корана. Основное внимание уделено его*

представлениям о природе человеческой души, её назначении, способностях и связи со Всевышним Аллахом. Цель исследования – выявить особенности рационально-философского тафсира мыслителя и определить влияние его философских воззрений на понимание коранических аятов, касающихся человеческой души и её существования в земном мире.

Методологическую основу исследования составляют рациональный и исторический подходы, а также методы анализа и сопоставления. Рассматриваются особенности толкования сур «ан-Нур», «ан-Нас» и «аль-Фалак», использование философских понятий при объяснении смысла аятов и их соотношение с религиозным учением. Взгляды Ибн Сины сопоставляются с подходом имама Фахр ад-Дина ар-Рази для выявления различий в философских основаниях понимания Корана. Отдельное внимание уделено влиянию философских представлений на правовое и рациональное осмысление аятов.

Показано, что Ибн Сина стремился согласовать философские воззрения с исламским вероучением и преодолеть видимые расхождения между кораническим текстом и философскими теориями. Его метод характеризуется обращением к рациональному иджтихаду – «манхадж аль-иджтихад аль-акли» – символическому толкованию отдельных коранических выражений. По мнению мыслителя, содержащиеся в Коране символы раскрывают глубокие истины, постижение которых доступно лишь ограниченному кругу обладателей знания. Такой подход определяет своеобразие его рационально-психологического истолкования аятов.

В статье также рассматриваются критические оценки философского тафсира, связанные с опасениями относительно возможного отступления от основ исламского вероучения и духовного содержания Корана при расширительном толковании его символов. Вместе с тем автор оспаривает обвинения в том, что толкования Ибн Сины вводят мусульман в заблуждение и отдаляют их от исламской веры. В этой связи обсуждается вопрос о соответствии философских интерпретаций мыслителя основному содержанию коранического текста. Результаты исследования позволяют глубже понять особенности метода Ибн Сины, характер взаимодействия философского рассуждения и религиозного учения в его тафсире, а также значение этого взаимодействия для понимания сур Корана.

Ключевые слова: Ибн Сина, философия Корана, философский тафсир, человеческая душа, рациональный иджтихад, сура «ан-Нур», сура «ан-Нас», сура «аль-Фалак», философские взгляды, Фахр ад-Дин ар-Рази.

Ибн Сина написал свой тафсир, руководствуясь стремлением объединить философские убеждения с религиозными учениями, и стремился сблизить видимые расхождения между Кораном и философскими теориями. Его метод включал в себя глубокий анализ текстов Корана с философской точки зрения, причем при толковании юридических аятов, побуждающих к рациональному мышлению, он часто использовал философские понятия. Он подчеркивал, что Всевышний Аллах заложил в Коране символические выражения, раскрывающие глубокие истины, которые могут понять только обладатели знаний. Ученый предполагал, что эти священные тексты служили тайными кодами, понятными лишь избранным лицам, подобным ему самому. Однако этот подход вызвал опасения по поводу отклонения от основной сути религии и духовных особенностей Священного Корана, поскольку он расширял эти символы в рамках своей философской системы. Цель данного исследования: 1) проанализировать, как философские взгляды Ибн Сина влияют на его толкование ключевых аятов, а также правовых аятов, направляющих к размышлению; 2) сравнить взгляды Ибн Сина с позицией других ученых, таких как Имам Фахруддин ар-Рази, путем освещения различий в философских рамках аятов и их значения для понимания Корана; 3) оценить философское влияние взглядов Ибн Сина на духовную сущность Корана, рассмотрев вопрос о том, согласуются ли его философские взгляды с основным содержанием текста Корана или нет. Полученные выводы позволяют глубже понять тот факт, что Ибн Сина использовал уникальные методы в понимании Корана.

Ключевые слова: *Ибн Сина, Коран, сура ан-Нур, сура ал-фалак, сура ан-нас, кораническая философия*

INTRODUCTION

The endeavor to reconcile philosophical beliefs with religious teachings has been a significant challenge throughout Islamic intellectual history. Ibn Sina (Avicenna), motivated by a profound desire to unify the apparent discrepancies between the Qur'an and philosophical theories, undertook a detailed examination of Qur'anic texts through a philosophical lens. His interpretive approach involved applying philosophical insights to legal passages, positing that the Prophet Muhammad embedded symbolic expressions in the Qur'an that conveyed profound truths accessible only to the learned. Ibn Sina contended that these Qur'anic scriptures functioned as secret codes, comprehensible to a select few, including himself (Gutas, 2001:88). However, this perspective raises critical questions regarding the authenticity of Ibn Sina's interpretations and their alignment with the true spirit of the Qur'an. The problem lies in the potential deviation from the core spiritual essence of the text, as his philosophical lens may overshadow its divine message. Furthermore, the philosophical community within Islam was not monolithic; various scholars either rejected or embraced Ibn Sina's ideas, leading to significant debate over the appropriateness of employing philosophical frameworks in religious interpretation (Nasr, 2006:155). This study seeks to evaluate Ibn Sina's interpretive methodology for coherence and persuasiveness, particularly focusing on his understanding of key passages such as Surat Al-Ikhlas. The findings aim to reveal the implications of his philosophical inclinations on Qur'anic interpretation,

especially in light of the contrasting views held by other scholars, such as Imam Al-Fakhr Al-Razi, who also engaged with philosophical theories but maintained a different approach to their integration with the Qur'an. And we discovered that several of the verses in the Holy Qur'an were actually descriptions of certain intellectual notions. Its goal is to elevate philosophy above the Holy Qur'an, which is the source of the religion's teachings and its genesis. The study aims to do the following: Analyze Ibn Sina's methodology, that is, to examine Ibn Sina's philosophical approach to interpreting Qur'anic texts and assess how his philosophical insights influence his understanding of key verses and legal passages. To conduct a comparative analysis of Ibn Sina's interpretations alongside those of other scholars, such as Imam Al-Fakhr Al-Razi, to highlight differences in their philosophical frameworks and implications for Qur'anic understanding. To evaluate the spiritual and theological implications or effects of Ibn Sina's interpretations on the spiritual essence of the Qur'an, considering whether his philosophical lens aligns with or detracts from the core religious messages of the text.

SINAI INTERPRETATION

There are two basic ways to understand philosophy according to the Sinai interpretation. The first deals with philosophy and philosophers, trying to disprove their theories and ideas as much as possible in the context of Islamic law. The second assumes control of the philosophical arguments, makes a case for them, and attempts to explain how the verses from the Qur'an relate to these ideas and theories (Al-Ghazali, 2000:54). We can analyze Fakhr al-Razi's (Mafatih al-Ghayb) interpretation in terms of benefit, brevity, and explanation to illustrate the first tendency (interpretation of Al-Baydawi and others). A model that embodies the second approach to the philosophical interpretation of the Holy Quran is presented herein. This approach employed philosophical analysis to interpret the texts in a way that aligns with the theories and viewpoints of the philosophers who have studied them (Dunia, 1962:162). In the philosophical context, rational interpretation developed as a means to clarify religious truths, marking the origin of philosophical concepts. Philosophers used interpretation to resolve any potential conflicts between the apparent meaning of religious texts and certain facts derived from logical reasoning. To demonstrate that there is no contradiction between revelation and reason, they argued that when faith is illuminated by the light of wisdom, it becomes firmly rooted in the soul. They further proved to their critics that if a text is comprehensible and does not contradict logic, there is no need for interpretation. Interpretation is only necessary when the apparent meaning of the text conflicts with reason. This passage reflects the philosophical approach to reconciling religious texts with rational thought. Philosophers believed that if religious teachings are understood clearly and align with logical reasoning, there should be no need for further interpretation. Interpretation was seen as essential only when there was a perceived conflict between the literal meaning of a religious text and rational proof, emphasizing the harmony they sought between faith and reason. (Al-Farabi A., 1985:282). Ibn Sina was very strict about reconciling religion and philosophy in order to satisfy both his religious and philosophical aspects. He writes: "The principles of the theoretical sections of philosophy are learned as a warning from the people of the Divine Religion, and they are devoted to obtaining them with perfection by rational strength as a way of argument, and whoever is given to complete himself with these two wisdoms and work with that with one of them has been given a lot of good" (Ibn Sina, 1881:244). As Ibn Sina became more versed in the Qur'an and philosophy, he judged philosophical theories in the Qur'anic texts. He explained them in a purely philosophical manner, and his way of explaining it was frequently for the purpose of explaining the legal texts with philosophical opinions. It is because he believed that the Qur'an is only a collection of symbols by the Prophet for public understanding, and he hid from them what the general public is unable to understand. He maintains that the stipulation for the prophet is that his speech be a symbol and his utterances a gesture, and as Plato mentions in the Book of Laws, "Whoever does not understand the meanings of the symbols of the messengers will not attain the divine kingdom (Dunia, 1962:24) Based on this, Ibn Sina believed that the Qur'an is a book of symbols that only the elite like him can understand. So, he applied all of his philosophical theories to explain it. As such, he was far from religious truth and the soul of the Holy Qur'an.

PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION

Ibn Sina's Explanation of the Meaning (The Throne)

Ibn Sina presented the explanation of what god is saying: "And there will bear the Throne of your Lord above them, that Day, eight of them (Sinai, 1037: 77)". He explains that the ninth throne is the orbit of the spheres and that eight angels carry the throne. So, we say that the extensive discourse on God's establishment over the Throne is one of his states: That the Throne is the end of the bodily creative beings (Hamlan, 1986:77). By "end of bodily creative beings," the text suggests that the Throne is the boundary or culmination of all

created, material existence. In other words, the Throne stands at the highest point or final frontier of the physical or material realm beyond which lies the unmanifested divine, transcendent of the physical universe. This can be understood as the point where the physical, "bodily" beings, those that exist within time and space, reach their ultimate end in the process of creation. The Throne marks the transition from the finite, corporeal, and temporal to the infinite and spiritual. God Almighty is on the Throne, but not in a way that "dissolves" or is absorbed into the Throne. This view is consistent with Aristotelian thought, particularly in his metaphysics, where he discusses the nature of the divine and the cosmos. In this context, philosophers and wise lawmakers agree that the body in question is the one that concerns the Throne, meaning the physical world or the celestial sphere. The motion of the celestial sphere, according to this view, is driven by the soul, and such motions can be categorized as either natural or psychological, depending on their nature. The spheres themselves are described as perfect, eternal, and unchanging, never perishing or undergoing transformation. In Islamic tradition, it is also held that angels are living beings who do not die like humans. In this metaphysical framework, the spheres are considered living entities that speak and are immortal and, therefore, are categorized as angels. Furthermore, it is explained that the Throne is supported by eight, which are interpreted as the orbits or celestial spheres (Al-Farabi, A., 1985:123). The passage combines philosophical concepts drawn from Aristotelian cosmology with Islamic theological views. It seeks to explain that God's presence is not physically contained in or limited to the Throne, but that the divine essence is transcendent. Describing the celestial spheres as "alive" and "speaking" links these philosophical ideas to the Islamic belief in angels as eternal, living beings who influence the cosmos. The "eight" that uphold the Throne refer to the celestial orbits, possibly symbolizing the interconnectedness of the universe, and reflecting the idea that the cosmos is structured in a way that aligns with both physical and spiritual realities (Ibn Sina, 1973:183). Ibn Sina contrasts two types of "holding"—the literal, physical act of carrying something and the more abstract, natural state of support in the world. He connects this to religious teachings about resurrection, affirming that the soul persists after death, which forms the basis of divine promises regarding the afterlife (Ibn Sina, 1973:28).

Ibn Sina's Interpretation of Heaven and Hell We discovered that Ibn Sina interprets heaven, fire, and the path in a philosophical manner that is far from correct. So, he divides the world into three sections: the real world, the imaginary world, and the mental world. The mental world for him is heaven. The imaginary world is hellfire. And the real world is the world of graves. He writes: … know that the mind needs extrapolation of the particulars, so it is inevitable that it needs the apparent sense, so you know that it takes from the apparent sense to the imagination to the illusion, and this is from paths hell difficult path until it reaches the essence of the mind, then it sees how the path is limit, and its way to hellfire, he reaches the world of the mind, and if he stops in it and imagines the illusion as a mind, and what it really refers to, then he has stood on hell, dwells in hell, and perishes, and he lost a clear loss (Mohammed, 1881:33).

Ibn Sina explained the eighth gate of heaven, and the seven gates of hell fire in a philosophical way: what Prophet Mohammad knows from his lord that hell has seven gates and heaven has eight gates since he knew that the perceived things are either perceived by particulars, such as the visible senses, which are five, perceive images with substances, or perceived by non-substances, such as the treasury of the senses called imagination, and a ruling power over which a non-obligatory judgment, which is illusion, and a ruling power is obligatory, which is the mind, that is eight. Eight elements come together in a way that brings eternal happiness and entry into Paradise, while seven of them, when separated from the eighth, lead to eternal misery. What is used in languages is that what leads to the thing is called a door, for the seven leading to the fire are called its gates, and the eight leading to heaven are called its doors. Ibn Sina interprets the gates of heaven and hell metaphorically, associating them with different cognitive faculties. The seven gates of hell represent faculties that lead to illusions and false judgments, while the eight gates of heaven are associated with faculties like reason and intellect that guide a person toward righteousness and ultimate happiness (Al-dahabi, 1976:23).

Ibn Sina Interpretation of "Over it are Nineteen [Angels]

Ibn Sina's interpretation of the verse "Over it are nineteen angels" (Surat Al-Muddaththir, 74:30) offers a philosophical perspective. He asserts that the soul of an animal, as it exists in Hell, is the permanent essence that remains, which he divides into two parts: one is cognitive and scientific, while the other pertains to emotional processes such as longing, anger, and desires. These emotional processes are perceived by the external senses, which Ibn Sina identifies as sixteen distinct senses. The imaginary power that governs these sensory images is non-rational (irrational), and it corresponds to a "self" or essence that is both sixteen in nature and influenced by the number nineteen. In explaining the phrase, "We have not made the companions of the Fire except angels" (Surat Al-Muddaththir, 74:31), Ibn Sina states that it is customary in philosophy to refer to subtle, imperceptible powers as "angels." These angels, in his view, represent powers that govern and influence the processes of perception and action, which are beyond

ordinary sensory perception (Ibn Sina, 1908:83).

Ibn Sina's Interpretation of Verse 35 of Surat Al-Nur

Ibn Sina explains the saying of the almighty Allah: "Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The example of His light is like a niche within which is a lamp, the lamp is within the glass, the glass as if it were a pearly (white) star lit from (the oil of) a blessed olive tree, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil would almost glow even if untouched by fire. Light upon light. Allah guides to His light whom He wills. And Allah presents examples for the people, and Allah is Knowing of all things. Ibn Sina. 1973 …Light is a common name for two meanings: subjective and borrowed, and subjective is the perfection of the healer in terms of healing, as mentioned by Aristotle, and the borrowed on two sides: either the news, or the reason leading to the news, and the meaning here is the borrowed section in its two parts... I mean that Allah Almighty is good in Himself and is the cause of all good, as well as self-judgment and non-self (Surat Al-Nur, 35). And the Almighty says, "The heavens and the earth is about the whole." Ibn Sina then explains that: (Mishkah) is a hyolan mind and the speaking soul because the niche is close to the walls and well prepared for illumination. Because everything is near the walls, the reflection was more severe and there was more light. Just as the mind is akin to light, its counterpart is also similar, being the healer and the best of empty words. And then, the best identity is the niche; the symbol in the niche is the hyolani mind that Ibn Sina attributed to the learned mind because the light is the perfection of the healer. It can be noted that Ibn Sina was also limited by philosophers and was finding ways towards force of action. Moreover, the ratio of the learned mind to the Heolan mind is like the ratio of the lamp to the niche, and saying,

In a bottle... Since there is a distinct level between the Heolan mind and the learned, as well as another space, its relationship can be compared to that between the healer and the lamp. The healer cannot reach the lamp without the mediation of the saddle, just as the bottle emerges from the theater because it is one of the lips, the channels for radiance .

Then he said, "as if it were a planet Dre to make it pure glass cured, not glass that does not heal, it is not something of the colorants cured, (kindled from a tree blessed olive) means by the intellectual power that is its subject and material for mental acts, as the essence subject and material for the lamp (Ibn Sina 1908, 61)".

Ibn Sina's Interpretation of Some Verses from Surat Al-Falaq

Ibn Sina says in the interpretation of the Almighty's saying: (And from the evil of those who practice sorcery):

A reference to the plant power, the plant entrusted with the management of the body, its origin and growth, and the body contract got from a contract between the four different elements conflicting to dissociation, but it is the intensity of emotion from each other has become an animal body, and the jets in it are the plant forces, the jets are a reason for the essence of the thing to become plus in amount from all sides. That is, length, width and depth. It is these forces that influence the increase of the nourishing and developing body from all the mentioned quarters (Ibn Sina, 1973).

The Almighty also says in verse 5 of Surat Al-Falaq: "And from the evil of an envier when he envies." Herein, Ibn Sina is using a philosophical framework to explain Quranic verses in a way that blends both the spiritual and physical aspects of existence. He interprets the "evil" in these verses not merely as external forces (like sorcery or envy), but as internal conflicts between the body's natural powers and the soul's rational or spiritual faculties.

This approach links the body's physical processes with deeper emotional and spiritual states, explaining how they affect the individual both physically and mentally (Al-Kurdi, 1917:12).

Ibn Sina's interpretation of verse 4 of Surat Al-Nas

In Surat Al-Nas, the Almighty explains his saying in verse 4:

(From the evil of the sneaking whisperer) … He says: 'This force that signs whisperer is the imagined force according to its becoming used for the animal soul, and then its movement is the opposite, the soul directed it to paradoxical principles, the imagined force if it attracted it to work with matter and its relations, that force is defiled (Al-Kurdi, 1917:25).

Ibn Sina then explains the saying of the Almighty in verse 6 of Surat Al-Nas also: (from Paradise and people), where he says: "The paradise is concealment, and the human being is domestication, the hidden things are the inner senses, and the domesticated are the apparent senses. In Ibn Sina's (Avicenna's) explanation of verse 6 of Surat Al-Nas ("From jinn and people"), he offers a metaphorical and philosophical interpretation that explores the relationship between the spiritual realm and the physical realm of human existence. In this context, he states: "The paradise is concealment, and the human being is domestication; the hidden things are the inner senses, and the domesticated are the apparent senses (Al-Kurdi, 1917:41).

LOGICAL INTERPRETATION

Ibn Sina's Interpretation of Surat Al-Ikhlas

Below is the manuscript of Ibn Sina in the interpretation of Surat Al-Ikhlas. The manuscript says:

"I praise him and praise from the sum of his blessings, and thank him and thanksgiving such as his pains, and prayers be upon Muhammad the seal of his prophets, his family and his guardians."

The interpretation by Sheikh President Abu Ali, which enlightens a third of the Qur'an on the limit of the Peripatetics, and the words of Hojjat al-Islam Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali on the rules of the speakers, is remarkable with Sheikh President emphasized: "Allah is one."2 He is absolute, meaning His identity does not depend on anything else. Whether His identity is viewed as separate from others or not, it remains the same. Unlike beings whose identity is defined in relation to others, His identity is independent and cannot be defined by any external factors. Furthermore, His identity is not tied to His presence in a particular place, unlike the first principle (or the foundational entity), which exists for itself in a more direct way. In His case, His identity is inseparable from His essence. This identity is unique and nameless, meaning it can only be understood through its characteristics, which include both additional and negative aspects. Some aspects are more clearly defined than others. The clearest understanding of His identity comes from recognizing that it is God. He is the one to whom everything else is attributed, but nothing else is attributed to Him. The first kind of meaning is additional (adding to His nature), while the second is negative (what He is not). This divine identity cannot be fully expressed in human terms because of His infinite majesty and greatness. Still, He is the One, and this is who He truly is (Aristotle, 2017:91). He then explained that identity is only possible through its attributes or supplies. As mentioned earlier, the most complete understanding of identity and its explanation comes from considering both types of supplies. There is no issue with referring to Allah by saying "He" as this can be seen as an explanation that clarifies what is meant by the term "He" It is important to note that Allah possesses none of the ingredients of existence (in the way created beings do). If one were to reverse the relationship between the identity and its supplies, it would create a deficiency. This explanation suggests that the unity and simplicity of Allah's identity require refraining from defining it in ordinary terms and instead focusing on its attributes. Since Allah's identity encompasses many supplies or attributes, these must be arranged in a sequence based on their closeness or distance to Him. The closest necessary attributes are more easily defined than those that are more distant because the necessary attributes (Maaloul) are connected to the same reason or cause (Ibn Almad, 1964:126).

What is reasonable is known only from the perspective of understanding its causes. The true definition is only immediately and necessarily required by the thing for itself and not for others. The first principle is not bound by any external cause or crisis prior to the necessity of its existence, for it is inherently obligated to exist, and by this very fact, it becomes the foundational principle for everything else. The sum of my understanding is the divinity that brings together the two aforementioned necessities. Existence is defined by an internal necessity; meaning that the essential nature of a thing (including divinity) is defined by its inherent qualities, not by external influences. The first principle (often associated with God or the First Cause in philosophy) exists because it must exist and, in doing so, becomes the foundation for everything else in the universe.

And the saying of the Almighty "one" is an exaggeration of unity:

And unity is a saying on what is underneath by questioning, and completely exaggerating it, but if the oneness so that it cannot be more complete and more complete than it, then the one who is not divided in one of the faces3 originally will be the first. What is divided from some facets, such as mental division, sensory which is actually or by force, and when it turns out that the fullest in the unit cannot be something more powerful than it, otherwise it is not an overstatement (Ibn Sina, 1908 : 223,232).

This passage reflects a philosophical interpretation of the divine unity, focusing on the perfection and indivisibility of the concept of "oneness" attributed to God. The key idea is that when something is described as "one" in the most perfect sense (especially in the context of God), it means that it is indivisible, without parts, and cannot be surpassed in its completeness. If it could be divided or made more complete, it would no longer retain its essential quality of perfect unity. The use of the term "exaggeration" here refers to the idea that divine unity is so perfect that no further enhancement or division is possible.

The term "anyone" in this context refers to absolute unity. It signifies a singular entity in contrast to the concept of "nothingness." The idea is that God's oneness transcends all forms of division or multiplicity. In contrast to the divisions we observe in the material world—such as distinctions of race, gender, class, matter, shape, color, and other sensory or conceptual categories—God's essence is indivisible and beyond all these classifications. These divisions are part of the created world, but God's unity is pure, undivided, and unique. The "oneness" of God is not comparable to anything with separate parts or distinctions.

The phrase "His identity is suspended from meeting parts, not for himself but for others" means that God's essence is not defined or dependent on any parts or divisions. His identity is complete in itself and does

not require segmentation or categorization, unlike things in the material world, which are often divided into parts for understanding.

The statement "God is resilient" has two possible interpretations. The first interpretation is negative: it emphasizes God's exclusion from anything that would limit or define Him. Everything in the created world that has identity or form is subordinate to God, and it lacks the fullness of God's essence. The second interpretation is positive: it emphasizes God's strength and mastery over everything. God's existence is not limited by time, space, or any external factors. Both interpretations are possible, but they point to the same fundamental truth that God is beyond all limitations and divisions.

The Almighty said: "He was not born, nor does He give birth." This statement emphasizes that God is not contingent upon anything else for His existence. Everything in creation is dependent on God, and He alone exists in a necessary, independent way. The notion of birth or being born does not apply to God, as He is not subject to any form of generation or dependency on others.

The idea conveyed here is that God's essence is unique and cannot be likened to any created being. The statement "He was not born" asserts that God's existence is not derived from or dependent on anything else, and He does not share His essence with anything or anyone. This clarifies that God's nature is not like that of any other being, who may be born, grow, or depend on something else for existence. He is self-sufficient, eternal, and beyond any form of generation or dependence. In this context, the assertion "No one is sufficient like Him," further reinforces this idea. It emphasizes that there is no other being or entity that can be compared to God in terms of essence, existence, or power. He is unique and unparalleled in His nature. This interpretation underscores the distinction between the Creator and the created: while all created things are dependent and finite, God is independent, eternal, and beyond any human concept of birth or generation (Khairallah, L., 2002:69).

Equalization has two dimensions: one involves equality in quality, and the other refers to equality in the necessity of existence. If the equality were to be in quality, it would contradict the words of the Almighty: "He was not born, nor does He give birth." In this context, the equality being discussed pertains to the necessity of existence, not quality. This means that God's existence is not dependent on anything or anyone else, and no being can be equal to Him in terms of existence or quality. To clarify, if equality were in quality, it would imply that God's essence could be compared or shared with another entity, which contradicts the principle of His unique and singular nature. The statement "He was not born" highlights that God has no origin, no parent, nor is He the product of any process of generation. His existence is not contingent on anything else. He is self-sufficient and not like any human or creature who comes into existence through birth. Furthermore, the phrase "He is not born, nor does He give birth", emphasizes that God is beyond the concept of birth and generation. His existence is independent of time, space, and any external cause. In contrast, everything in creation is dependent on something else for existence, but God stands apart as the eternal, uncaused cause of all things. The phrase "Allah Al-Samad" (God, the Eternal, the Absolute) reflects God's selfsufficiency and uniqueness. It signifies that He is the ultimate, independent being who does not rely on anything else, and nothing can compare to Him. He is not born, nor does He give birth, and no one can be equal to Him in existence. His essence is beyond human comprehension and categorization, and His truth is unified and singular. Thus, the statement is a declaration of God's unmatched nature He is unique in all aspects, both in terms of His essence and His existence, and cannot be compared to anything or anyone else in creation. In completing the explanation of this concept, the speaker first addresses the pure essence of the entity, which is beyond naming, as it transcends human categorization. He then proceeds to mention the divine, which is the closest and most accurate description of that essence. Afterwards, the concept of monotheism is introduced in relation to the first two aspects, to avoid the incomplete definition that could arise from focusing solely on one attribute.

The second part of the explanation indicates that the divine essence, in its totality, is unified in every aspect. It emphasizes that divine monotheism is a necessary order one that includes the divine as the source of all existence. The divine is described as the dispensation of everything and the absolute need of all beings. Without this unified divine essence, everything would require its parts to exist, highlighting the importance of the divine as the singular, all-encompassing source of reality.

To clarify, the essence of the divine cannot be broken into separate, divisible parts. It is complete and unified in its entirety, and any reference to the divine must emphasize its wholeness and indivisibility. The concept of monotheism underlines that the divine is the fundamental source of all things, and everything depends on this single, unified force.

"Allah Al-Samad" refers to the realization of the meaning of God by resilience, which means the necessity of existence and the principle of the existence of all other assets. In this context, the divine essence is fully self-aware, recognizing its own existence in its entirety. The ultimate goal of acquiring knowledge is to understand God, His attributes, and how His actions

manifest from Him. This Surah is said to be equivalent to one-third of the Qur'an because it encapsulates the essence of divine knowledge and understanding. By delving into its meanings, one can uncover the secrets of this Surah and gain insight into the deeper truths of God's words. Essentially, this Surah offers a profound understanding of God's nature, and through it, one can grasp the secrets of His existence and actions.

We note here that Ibn Sina presented the logical analysis of the words and structures of Surat Al-Ikhlas more cumulatively, without a clear appearance to load the text with philosophical theories as it appeared in his philosophical interpretation (Nasser, 1910:72).

In order to illustrate the logical interpretation of Ibn Sina's philosophical discipline and novelty, I will limit myself to mentioning the distinction established by Ibn Sina between existence and essence, from which he benefited from philosophers, theologians and even Western theologians.

Since the Arabs conveyed Greece's philosophy and logic in Arabic, they found two phrases in them, and if they differed in their word, they seemed to have two meanings: Ozia, and Tu Este. Their transfer of these terms has predominated, in essence, and in Mahiya, although the first teacher (Aristotle) has consistently used both terms, to indicate the meaning of the self-proclaimed and self-valued. And he is not everything he does. Likewise, what is self-evident is because it is worth it, it is also better to be intrinsic. It is not anything.

Aristotle asserts that there is a form of knowledge concerned with understanding what exists, which he refers to as "first philosophy." This concept can be interpreted in two ways. First, it could mean that first philosophy applies to all levels of existence, encompassing both the physical world and the metaphysical principles behind it, including the primary cause or first principle. Second, Aristotle views the "unmoved mover, " as a fundamental force that initiates motion without itself being moved, as central to this philosophy. First philosophy, according to Aristotle, is distinct from other sciences in that it is not just a specialized field of study. Its subject matter is broader and more foundational, seeking to understand the ultimate causes of existence, which makes it more comprehensive than all other areas of knowledge (Hamlan, 1986:1021).

Ibn Sina then explained that the concept of universal presence which applies to all things can be seen within this framework. These things, when considered individually, are subjects of specific sciences, each having its own domain of knowledge. However, when you look at the whole picture, this becomes the first topic in the study of what exists. This is because this science does not focus on specific aspects of what exists in isolation, but rather, it looks at existence itself in its entirety. It examines being as such, without focusing on the particular properties or details of the things that exist. In this sense, it only concerns itself with the existence of something, rather than the nature of the thing that exists. Ibn Sina then adopted this second way of interpreting Aristotle's earlier definition of first philosophy, which is the study of being qua being that is, the study of existence itself, in the most general sense.

Existence is singled out as the primary subject of first philosophy because all other entities fall under it. While different beings or phenomena may vary in their particular forms, they all share the common attribute of existence. However, existence itself is less a manifestation of something distinct than a universal principle that is foundational to all things. Therefore, if we do not have any understanding of existence itself, we cannot define it, and the only proof of existence is through direct experience. In other words, existence is self-evident and needs no external proof it is a given.

When we focus solely on this obvious, primary meaning of existence, we recognize two types: the "first" is absolute existence, while the "second" is a more restricted form of existence, which is limited and defined by something else. However, this restriction does not alter the essence of existence itself. Existence, in its pure form, is universal, but a specialized form of existence only arises when something additional is added to it. This distinction between existence and other attributes has not yet addressed the real difference between "identity" (what something is) and "existence" (the fact that something is). Therefore, before discussing this distinction further, it is necessary to first consider the concept of "Mahiyah", which is the essence or nature of a thing.

The second teacher, Al-Farabi, made a distinction between "essence" and "substance" (Al-Budoor, 2006:101). He allocated a different meaning to the term "essence" compared to the traditional Greek understanding. For Al-Farabi, essence carries a more general meaning than the classical Greek notion. While every substance (or thing) has an essence, not every essence is considered a substance. In other words, essence is only essence when it truly exists, whereas a substance can be something more than just its essence.

Al-Farabi explained that essence refers to that which exists independently in reality, and it is also the fundamental constituent of anything that exists. If essence is considered a denominator in this context, it means that it is based solely on the essence itself. The essence is the foundational component of a being, and when considered as a whole, it refers to the full substance of that being. The essence must, by definition, be itself an essence it cannot be something other than what it is. However, this essence does not define its

relationship to existence on its own, but rather in relation to something else, indicating that its existence is always contextual and connected to external factors.

In defining essence, it is understood as the inherent nature of a thing, distinct from the Aristotelian notion where essence was considered as the substance that exists in itself. Unlike the ancient Greeks, Islamic philosophers viewed essence and existence as interconnected. Essence, in this context, is what defines the identity of a thing, and if something is an essence, it also represents its attributes. In other words, the essence of a thing is not separate from what it offers or its qualities; it is intrinsically linked to its existence and what it manifests.

Ibn Sina, like al-Farabi, refined the concept of essence by separating it from the Greek notion of essentialism. For Ibn Sina, essence refers to what a thing is, independent of how it exists or manifests. This distinction between "being" and "essence" allowed Ibn Sina to break away from the traditional Greek metaphysics, which asserted that all truth is grounded in what exists and that knowledge can only concern the existent. By clearing away the Greek influence on essence, Ibn Sina paved the way for a new metaphysical approach, one that acknowledged a deeper understanding of being beyond mere existence.

Everything has its essence, and the essence is what the thing has in it because not everything in the thing, what is in the thing is it, and what is meant by what is in the thing is it, if it raises a fact or an illusion, the thing itself rises not only in terms of its existence, but in terms of its same perception. For example, if we think of a triangle, so what is it that one should get from the triangle? It is the fact that it is a flat shape composed of three sides! The flat shape and the triangular are the parts of what a triangle is, and their composition is what it is itself. Except for these two qualities, if we assume that they are higher than the triangle, do we refrain from conceiving its reality? Not at all! No one can understand what a triangle is unless they realize that it is a flat shape with three sides. But how many of those people who, although they understand the meaning of a triangle, do not imagine at all its characteristic, since the sum of its angles is never equal to two right angles? This attribute, which the geometrician would demonstrate, no matter how much his mind lifts it from the very essence of the triangle, will never make a real triangle present in their minds. So, this characteristic, though absolutely necessary for the triangle in terms of it being a triangle, is not at all a denominator of its truth as it is.

IBN SINA'S DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND BEING

We have stated that existence is an obvious concept, the first thing the soul recognizes; and since it is self-evident, it resists any attempt to define it. What is there to define if existence is only understood through experience, a kind of intuitive recognition? If existence is the basis for knowing things, yet we cannot truly know its essence, then nothing can define or fully comprehend it. Therefore, existence itself cannot be fully known or grasped in a definitive way.

While the definition of existence has not been defined, another way to address it by division. The division of existence has many ways. There is a first and great division of existence according to its rank, which is its division into mental existence and physical existence. Physical existence is its existence outside, and mental existence is the occurrence of something that exists in the mind. If it is in the mind, it is reasonable, imagined, or perceived by a common sensory perception. If it exists outside, it is either a perceptible substance, or a sensible essence, and this sensible essence is itself of ranks. The lowest of which is the essence of the human mind. The middle of which is the heavenly mind. And the highest of which is the divine mind. Collectively, existence does not depart from either mental or in kind.

And here we are asking this question: if something has to be either in the mind, or outside, is it also a constituent part of what that thing is or not? Is the existence of a thing a part of what that thing has in it? Absolutely not. If the existence of a thing were inherent in its essence, meaning that its reality is what it is in itself, then we would expect that whatever is contained within the thing would always be present. However, we observe that what is inside a thing does not always manifest in the same way, nor does it always exist in the same state. If something exists in reality, it cannot be imagined in a different form from its true existence. If it were never to exist as it truly is; then, based on this reasoning, nothing could ever truly exist. This would make all things eternal, which contradicts the observable reality where things come into existence and cease to exist. This is the first answer.

A second philosophical answer can be added to further clarify the matter. We have stated that the essence of an object, or its component parts, refers to what remains constant even when its form or existence changes. For example, consider a triangle: if we imagine the triangle in the mind, draw it on paper, or construct it from wood or iron, the core essence of the triangle the concept of being a triangle remains the same. However, the triangle exists in different forms: in the mind, on a canvas, or as a physical object. The question is whether the true nature of the triangle, its essence, remains the same in each of these different existences. Does the reality of the triangle, as an object, still hold true even when it is merely a mental image or a representation, or does it only truly exist when it takes a physical form?

Not at all. For if it were, the mind would realize that the triangle in the mind is a reality that is fundamentally different from the triangle that exists in reality. This But the mind does not perceive the triangle in the mind as different in essence from the triangle that exists in reality, so if the existence of the triangle in the mind or in fact is not constituent of what it is, then if it opposes it, then existence is not what it is, it is a symptom of it. This distinction is crucial for understanding the nature of existence and essence.

Existence is the presentation a thing. That is the great extraction, and famous phrase upheld by Ibn Sina, and then received by Islamic Al-Fakhr Al-Razi, Al-Qutb Al-Razi, Saad Al-Din Al-Taftazani, Mullah Sadr Al-Din Al-Shirazi; and received as well by Christian theologians, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus. The effects of this phrase continue to linger in modern and contemporary philosophy (Al-Razi, 2004). The fact that existence is a presentation of the essence does not require that it is every essence, as existence is a presentation of it, as it may be agreed that we find a nature for which existence is a constituent part. But this evaluation does not have it in terms of what it is at all, but in terms of what is a certain essence. Since we can divide existence into another division, we divide it into a necessary existence and another that contingent. And then, necessary existence may be divided into necessary in itself, and necessary in others. What is necessary in others is in its origin possible in itself, so it is poor from existence; but existence receives it from the cause of others, existence is not from its reality, it is opposed to it. As for the necessary existence itself, it is the one whose very reality implies its existence. Its existence has no other, that is, the ratio of existence to what it is as the threesided ratio of the triangle. This is the divine being or divine essence.

The distinction between existence and essence, according to Ibn Sina, can be considered to have two apparent ranks:

1. The distinction between the concept of the absolute existence and the absolute what is, without specification or limitation. In other words, the pure concept of existence, as discussed by Ibn Sina, refers to the essence of existence itself, indicating a self-contained reality. This differs from the pure meaning of something having a reality as it is, which refers to the specific nature or existence of a thing. The former addresses existence in its most abstract form, while the latter pertains to the inherent reality of a thing in its defined state.

2. The distinction between a specific essence and the fact that this essence exists cannot be applied to all essences. This distinction particularly deviates when considering the divine essence. While the divine essence is simple and without composition, existence itself is integral to it. Thus, God's existence is identical to His essence. In contrast, for all other beings, existence is external to their essence it is a quality or attribute of them, not inherent to their nature. These beings require a cause or reason for their existence, which is granted to them or bestowed upon them. Ultimately, the chain of existence must culminate in a being whose existence is not dependent on anything else, which Ibn Sina refers to as the "necessary being" or the "necessary existence".

CONCLUSION

Ibn Sina's treatment of interpreting Quranic texts, which involves delineating between general apparent meanings and esoteric symbols, demonstrates an approach aimed at revealing deeper layers of understanding. He demonstrated profound concepts through Quranic verses, offering insights beyond the comprehension of the masses.

However, Ibn Sina's departure from mere symbolic representation towards delving into realms of the unseen is faced with criticisms. This expansion of interpretation beyond the physical realm risks judgments on unverifiable matters, which contradicts the purpose of knowledge acquisition for cognitive benefits rather than imaginative speculation.

Philosophical interpretation emerged as a means to reconcile religious doctrines with rational thought. Philosophers utilized interpretation to resolve potential conflicts between religious texts and logical deductions, emphasizing the harmony between revelation and reason. Clear texts require no interpretation unless they conflict with rational proofs.

The issue with philosophical interpretation lies not in its use of concepts to reconcile revelation with reason but in its tendency to reinterpret texts to align with philosophical doctrines, potentially distorting their original meanings. Interpretation, as posited by Ibn Sina and other philosophers, is seen as a prerogative of scholars, reserved for those wellversed in its nuances.

Hermeneutics has exerted a significant and sometimes problematic influence across various intellectual and religious spheres, particularly in Islamic contexts. It has been utilized to support differing interpretations, influenced by political and social factors, thereby contributing to scholarly and ideological disputes.

The study's findings underscore the complexity of interpreting religious texts, particularly within Islamic scholarship. Ibn Sina's approach, while aimed at unveiling deeper meanings, raises questions about the balance between symbolic representation and speculative interpretation. Moreover, the role of

philosophy in interpreting religious texts highlights the ongoing dialogue between revelation and reason. However, the risk of philosophical interpretation veering into doctrinal alignment rather than genuine understanding necessitates caution. Furthermore, the notion of interpretation as a scholarly privilege prompts reflection on the accessibility of religious knowledge and the authority vested in interpreters. The discussion also delves into the broader implications of hermeneutics, acknowledging its dual role as both a tool for enlightenment and a potential source of contention. Overall, these conclusions and discussions invite further inquiry into the dynamics of interpretation within religious discourse, emphasizing the need for critical engagement with diverse perspectives to foster a nuanced understanding of scripture and its interpretations.

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